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CRIMINAL LAW
THE BOUNDARIES OF PLEA BARGAINING:
NEGOTIATING THE STANDARD OF PROOF
TALIA FISHER*
This Article explores the boundaries of the plea bargainingprocess and
makes a case for extending these boundaries to the criminal standard of
proof. It examines the possibility of converting the criminal standard of
proof into a default rule, subject to negotiation between the parties. Under
current plea bargainingpractices, the defendant agrees to plead guilty in
exchange for concessions on punishment offered by the prosecutor.
According to the model proposed here, the negotiationprocess would not
be limited to the attainment of a full admission of guilt. Rather, the
prosecutor would also be able to obtain from the defendant a reduction of
the standardof proofrequiredto establish criminal culpability in returnfor
an offer of leniency in sentencing. For instance, the parties could agree
that the case will be tried according to the civil standard of proof-the
preponderance of the evidence. In exchange for the greater risk of
conviction faced by the defendant under a lower standard of proof the
prosecutor would make a partialconcession on the sentence in the event of
conviction. This Article addresses the viability of this proposed model and
advocates its normative desirability.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Ever since the practice of plea bargaining took root in the AngloAmerican legal world, the face of the criminal sphere has changed beyond
recognition. The public model of criminal procedure, which places the
procedural aspects of the process beyond the reach of the defense and the
prosecution, has given way to a new model: a semi-private paradigm that
acknowledges the right of the parties to wield effective control over the
procedural structure of the criminal trial. The adoption of plea bargains
expresses a readiness to open the criminal arena to contractual ordering.'
Many features of the criminal process have turned into default rules and
"bargaining chips"' in the hands of the defense, including the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, 3 the Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial,4 and the right to appeal.5 In exchange for deviation from and
waiver of these rights, the defendant may receive various concessions from
the prosecution, including mitigation in the charge or the sentence. This
allows for the efficient resolution of the criminal case, and enables both
prosecutor and defendant to avoid the costs of trial.6 In addition to their

1See Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure:The Warren and
Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 219 (1983) (claiming that plea
bargaining expresses a "privatization" of the criminal dispute).
2 See Nancy J.King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation,
47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 114-15 (1999) (arguing that almost every procedural characteristic of
the criminal trial has become a bargaining chip in the hands of the defendant); see also
Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 593, 595-96 (2005)
(describing a shift from adjudication to negotiation both in the criminal sphere and in the
civil procedural landscape).
3 "[E]ntering into a plea bargain... [t]he defendant is essentially waiving many
significant rights, including a trial by a jury of peers, the confrontation of witnesses, and the
right to challenge the evidence against him .. " Brenna K. DeVaney, The "No-Contact"
Rule: Helping or Hurting Criminal Defendants in Plea Negotiations?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 933, 942-43 (2001).

4 Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox,97 Nw. U. L. REv. 801, 801 (2003) (claiming
that the right to a jury trial or the right against self-incrimination are routinely bargained
away in the criminal arena, in exchange for sentence reduction).
5 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 165 (1990). The specific holding in Whitmore v.
Arkansas relates to the issue of standing, and therefore does not directly address the
waivability of appellate review. However, for all practical purposes, the decision is
equivalent to the recognition of waiver of the right to appeal, for the only party with standing
to challenge the waiver is the defendant himself, who chose to waive it in the first place.
Harold J. Krent, Conditioningthe President's Conditional Pardon Power, 89 CAL. L. REv.
1665, 1692-93 (2001) (arguing that defendants bargain away their right to an appeal through
plea bargaining).
6 The focus of this Article is on the standard of proof, but it is possible to further examine
the alienability of additional rights, including the defendant's substantive rights: For
example, the defendant's ability to waive his right to raise certain arguments on his behalf,
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attributed efficiency, plea bargaining practices can be normatively anchored
in the defendant's autonomy of will, 7 and in his right to effective control of

his fate.
This Article explores the boundaries of the negotiations under
discussion and examines whether the current borderlines, set between
alienable procedural rights (which the defendant may waive in exchange for
sentence mitigation) and inalienable procedural rights (which may not be
waived) can be justified. It makes a case for expanding the range of
alienable procedural rights with regard to plea bargaining and for the
extension of the boundaries of negotiation in the criminal arena. The test
case on which I choose to focus, in order to examine the expansion of the
negotiation borderlines, touches on the standard of proof. This Article
examines the issue of changing the criminal standard of proof to a default
variable from which the prosecution and defense can agree to deviate.
According to the model under examination, the prosecutor would be able to
"acquire" from the defendant a reduction of the standard of proof required
during the criminal trial. The parties could agree that the standard of proof
to which the prosecutor must adhere, in order to meet the burden of proof,
For example, the
will be less than "beyond a reasonable doubt."
prosecution would be able to obtain a conviction if it established the case
against the defendant in accordance with the civil standard of proofThe prosecution may also obtain
preponderance of the evidence.
"exemption" from the need to present corroborative evidence, or even reach
an agreement for the reversal of the burden of proof between the parties, in
which case the defendant takes it upon himself to prove his innocence
beyond a reasonable doubt. In exchange for the greater risk of being
convicted under a lower standard of proof, the defendant would face a
lighter sentence in the event of conviction. The degree to which his
sentence is reduced would reflect the extent to which the agreed-upon
standard of proof deviated from the negotiable default constituted by the
criminal standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt." It should be emphasized
that the basis for stipulation and deviation from the standard of criminal
such as claims of self defense or insanity, in exchange for a reduced sentence in the event of
conviction.
7 Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1978
(1992) (presenting plea bargains as a compromise supported by considerations of autonomy
and efficiency); see also John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of
Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 490 n.231 (2001); Robert E. Scott &
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingas Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1913 (1992) (claiming
that autonomy considerations justify plea bargaining as a manifestation of the defendant's
freedom of choice and freedom of contract).
8 See George E. Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure:A Brieffor More Careful Analysis,
55 TEX. L. REv. 193, 219 (1977).
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proof would be consensual, expressing the mutual wishes of both parties to
the judicial process. 9
Under the current legal regime, the standard of proof is considered a
constitutional safeguard of the criminal trial.1 0 The fundamental principle,
that the prosecution must bear the burden of proving all elements of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt as a prerequisite to conviction, dates back to the
eighteenth century"' and constitutes a "bedrock" principle of American
criminal procedure.12 The Supreme Court explicitly adopted this standard
as a constitutional requirement in the 1970 case In re Winship.' 3 The Court
held that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
require the protection of the accused against conviction "except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged."' 14 Justice Frankfurter lauded the reasonable
doubt rule as playing "a vital role in the American scheme of criminal
procedure."' 15 This quantum of proof is ubiquitous, and applies to every

9 The civil process also provides leeway for negotiating the standard of proof. In this
connection, one can imagine an agreement to raise the standard of proof from civil to
criminal, in exchange for a corresponding increase in recovery in the event of a verdict for
the plaintiff. Further, one might imagine a situation where both parties agree to deviate from
the existing binary model of "winner takes all" (the "p > 0.5 Rule") to the probabilistic
recovery model: The parties could thus decide that the claim would be tried according to the
balance of probability to which they adhere (in other words, that in the event the court rules
that the plaintiff has proven his case to an 0.6 degree of certitude, he would receive 60% of
the value of the claim, and in the event that the court rules that the plaintiff has only proven
his case to an 0.3 degree of certainty, he would receive 30% of the value of the claim). See
ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 23 (2001) (discussing
Probabilistic Recoveries).
As indicated previously, this study focuses on the criminal sphere, in light of its inherent
public nature and the underlying assumption that the potential problems lurking in the
proposed model become even more apparent when dealing with the criminal process.
Nevertheless, conclusions can also be drawn in regard to the possibility of negotiating the
standard of proof in the civil sphere.
10The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Due Process Clause
prohibits the conviction of a defendant except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. See, e.g., United
States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509-10 (1995).
11 Bruce A. Antkowiak, JudicialNullification, 38 CREIGHTON L. REv. 545, 560 (2005).
12 Azhar J. Minhas, ProofBeyond a Reasonable Doubt: Shifting Sands of a Bedrock?, 23
N. ILL. U. L. REv. 109, 109 (2003).
13 Henry D. Gabriel & Katherine A. Barski, Reasonable Doubt Jury Instructions: The
Supreme Court Struggles to Live by its Principles,11 ST. JOHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 73, 74
(1995).
14 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is among the essentials of due process, required during the adjudicatory stage when a
juvenile is charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult).
"5 Id. at 363.
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criminal trial.' 6 Its significance is accentuated when contrasted with other
or jury trial, which are
procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel
7
not mandated inevery criminal proceeding.'
In light of the fact that the standard of proof currently constitutes a
nonnegotiable, fixed, and indivisible feature of the criminal process, the
prosecution and defense have only two polar options to choose from when
bargaining to settle the criminal case. The first is to conduct a full trial,
placing the entire burden of proof upon the prosecution. The second is to
enter a plea bargain, whereby the prosecution gains full exemption from
having to prove its incriminating case. In other words, due to the
indivisible, nonnegotiable nature of the criminal standard of proof, the
existing model of plea bargaining is based upon self-incrimination by the
defendant.' 8 Such self-incrimination can relate to all areas of the criminal
"dispute" (as occurs in plea bargains of the sentence bargaining' 9 type) or,
alternatively, it can apply on certain portions only (as occurs in bargains of
the charge bargaining20 type). In this sense, under current plea bargains the
prosecution obtains a vertical exemption from the requirements of proof: a
full exemption vis-A-vis some component of the factual case against the
defendant, or the case in its entirety.
16This standard applies both with respect to misdemeanors and to felonies, at all degrees
of offense, and even when the case is tried without a jury. See United States v. Randolph, 93
F.3d 656, 660 (9th Cir. 1996).
17George M. Dery III, The Atrophying of the Reasonable Doubt Standard: The United
States Supreme Court'sMissed Opportunity in Victor v. Nebraska and Its Implications in the
Courtroom, 99 DICK.L. REv. 613, 614 (1995).
18See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargainingand Its History, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 211,
213 (1979) (discussing the self-incriminating nature of plea bargains). However, some
practices exist whereby the defendant accepts a prearranged sentence, reached by a plea
bargain, even in the absence of an admission of guilt. See Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing
Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo
Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1361 (2003) (discussing plea bargains of the Alford
and nolo contendere types).
19Sentence bargaining involves an agreement between the parties as to the defendant's
punishment. In such bargains, the defendant admits to the charges made against him in
exchange for the imposition of a lighter sentence. See Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Comment,
Should We Really "Ban " Plea Bargaining?: The Core Concerns of Plea BargainingCritics,
47 EMORY L.J. 753, 756 (1998).
20 Charge bargaining is not explicitly aimed at the sentence a defendant will face
(although this concern motivates such bargains). Rather, in plea bargains of this nature, the
prosecution agrees to amend the indictment and drop certain charges against the defendant,
in exchange for his guilty plea with regard to other charges. See Joseph S. Hall, Rule
11(e)(1)(C) and the Sentencing Guidelines: BargainingOutside the Heartland?,87 IOWA L.
REV. 587, 593 (2002); see also William W. Wilkins, Jr., Plea Negotiations, Acceptance of
Responsibility, Role of the Offender, and Departures:Policy Decisions in the Promulgation
of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 181, 185-86 (1988) (discussing
the differences between charge bargaining and sentence bargaining).
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The proposed model would enhance the possibilities available to both
parties by adding the option of a horizontal exemption from the
requirements of proof. In accordance with this alternative option, the
defendant would not make a full confession to any single part of the
dispute, but would make it possible for the prosecution to reduce the
standard of proof necessary for criminal conviction across the board. This
new version of plea bargains would enable the prosecution to obtain partial
exemption from the burden of proof for the entire dispute. To illustrate a
possible implication of the proposed model, let us take a hypothetical rape
case and assume significant disparities between the parties' subjective
evaluations of its outcome in court. Let us assume the prosecution is of the
opinion that under the "beyond a reasonable doubt" rule it has a 40%
chance of obtaining a criminal conviction. Let us further assume that the
prosecutor estimates that, if convicted, the defendant will be sentenced to
twenty years in prison. The defendant, for his part, assesses his chances of
being convicted completely differently. In his opinion, the probability of
his being convicted under the criminal standard of proof is only 20%, due to
an alibi claim he wishes to raise in court. He estimates that, if convicted, he
will be sentenced to fifteen years in prison. In order to simplify the
argument at this stage, I will focus only on the expected sanction, as
perceived by each side, disregarding additional parameters such as the
decline or increase in the marginal costs associated with each year of
imprisonment over successive years. 2' I will also assume reasonable costs
of trial. These issues will be discussed in detail later in the Article.22
Under the abovementioned set of assumptions, the lack of congruity
between each party's assessment 23 of the expected punishment can stand in
the way of reaching a full plea bargain.2 4 The prosecutor would offer the
defendant a prison term of slightly less than eight years (the length of the
expected sentence times the probability of conviction, minus the costs of

21

See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of

Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (1999) (discussing the
way by which individuals' disutility from imprisonment varies with the length of the
imprisonment term).
22 See discussion infra Part II.D. l.a.
23 This is due to low levels of certainty in the criminal sphere, to information
asymmetries, and to various cognitive biases such as over-optimism. See Oren Bar-Gill, The
Evolution and Persistence of Optimism in Litigation, 22 J.L. Eco. & ORG. 490, 491 (2006)
(discussing the evolution of an optimism bias, leading to breakdown of pre-trial
negotiations).
24 In situations of risk aversion, a full plea bargain may be struck even though the parties
do not agree on the expected punishment. The effects of the defendant's attitude toward risk
on the tendencies to reach plea bargains will be discussed in upcoming sections of this
Article. See discussion infra Part II.D. 1.b.
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trial) in exchange for his self-incriminating guilty plea. The defendant, for
his part, would demand that, if convicted, he be sentenced to a maximum of
slightly more than three years (the expected punishment, in his opinion,
plus costs of trial). Thus, from the point of view of the prosecutor, the
reduction in years demanded by the defendant, in exchange for his selfincriminating guilty plea, is too large. But from the defendant's point of
view, the prosecution's demand of a full guilty plea is too high a price to
pay for saving trial costs. Therefore, in the current situation of a
nonnegotiable standard of proof ("beyond a reasonable doubt") the parties
will most likely seek the trial option. For such cases, the proposed model
can open the door to settlements that would benefit both parties. Let us
now introduce a new variable, according to which the defendant can
"exchange" concessions in the standard of proof for mitigation of the
sanction in case of conviction. Let us further assume that, following the
move to a civil standard of proof ("preponderance of the evidence"), the
expected sentence envisioned by each of the parties changes as follows: The
prosecution calculates that the move to a civil standard of proof will result
in a 90% probability of conviction. This is because from the prosecution's
point of view the difficulties of proof relate mostly to the elimination of any
reasonable doubt. The defendant, for his part, believes that the move to a
"preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof will not dramatically
aggravate his situation because of the alibi claim that he is keeping under
his hat. In his opinion, the likelihood of conviction through the move to a
"civil" standard of proof will only increase by 5% (from a 20% to a 25%
chance of conviction). In this scenario, the prosecution's proposal to
request a ten-year sentence upon conviction, in exchange for moving to a
"civil" standard of proof will enable both parties to increase their expected
utility. 25 The prosecution's expected sanction will rise to nine years (an
improvement on the original option of eight years). The defendant will face
an expected sanction of only two-and-a-half years (an improvement on the
original option of three years).
As will be demonstrated later, the proposed model can serve as an
attractive alternative not only to a full trial, but also to the existing form of
plea bargaining. a6 I will also demonstrate that when variables such as
litigation costs and attitude toward risk are taken into account, the proposed
model can improve both parties' expected utility (in relation to the current
plea bargain or to trial according to the criminal standard of proof) even
under conditions of full information.27 At this point, I will only make an
25 As in the case of plea bargaining, the proposed model will enable both parties, through
optimal strategic behavior, to maximize their expected utility.
26 See discussion infra Part lI.D. .b.
27 See discussion infra Part lI.D. 1.
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intuitive claim for the model: the proposed model offers each party the
option to "insure" itself partially against the outcome of the criminal trial.
Because of the move to a lower standard of proof, the "danger of acquittal"
to which the prosecution is exposed is reduced, due to a somewhat
increased probability of conviction. However, this risk is not entirely
eliminated because the prosecution does not obtain a full guilty plea, as
would be the case under the current full plea bargain practice. The
defendant, too, is partially insured, because the extent of the sanction he
faces upon conviction has diminished, but not to the "maximal" penalty
reduction level, as in the current full plea bargain. Of course, the main
reason for choosing "partial insurance" (the proposed model) over "full
insurance" (the current plea bargain) stems from the costs of each of these
policies: Obtaining full insurance against the risk of a criminal conviction
entails a high price for each party. In the event that the bargain is accepted,
the defendant must relinquish all possibility of acquittal. The prosecution,
for its part, must "pay" in maximal sanction reduction. In other words,
according to the existing model of plea bargaining (which is subject to the
nonnegotiable standard of proof), the degree of risk involved in a criminal
proceeding is limited to polarized solutions: carrying the full risk of a legal
process under a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof or
comprehensive cancellation of risk by eliminating the need for a factfinding process. In contrast, the proposed model allows far greater
flexibility in the apportionment of risk within the framework of the judicial
process, enabling more optimal solutions. It sets the stage for partial
diminution of the risks involved in adjudication. Thus, it enables the parties
to regulate the degree of risk to which they are willing to expose
themselves, on the basis of its inherent cost. Accordingly, the parties can
concoct their own mix of optimal risk and cost, unfettered by extreme
solutions.2 8
Similar claims can be made for the reduction of the costs of trial. The
proposed model does not completely eliminate trial costs, as does the
existing plea bargain, but it enables the parties to reallocate costs and lower
the overall cost of trial. This point will be analyzed more thoroughly in
upcoming sections, which will also be devoted to the question of why
partial reduction in trial costs may be more beneficial to the parties, under
certain circumstances, than their full elimination. 29 At this point, I will
briefly explain the underlying intuition: One can posit a situation where the

28

This point will be discussed in upcoming sections of the Article. See discussion infra

Part II.D. 1
29 See discussion infra Part II.D.
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task of proving the final X percent 30 of the prosecution's case requires a
vast investment in resources on its part, such as the monetary cost of
obtaining evidence from out-of-state witnesses, the emotional price paid by
child witnesses, or the cost of revealing evidence where the prosecution
wants to preserve the cover of police agents. The prosecution may regard
this evidence as crucial for proving its case "beyond a reasonable doubt"
but find it unnecessary when a move to a lesser standard of proof has been
made. The reason for opting for a cheaper judicial process over a full plea
bargain (which cuts down on the full costs of trial involved) stems from the
differential prices of the two alternatives, in terms of sentence reduction. 3'
The partial reduction of risk and costs vis-A-vis the criminal trial is not
unique to the proposed model and is not a novel phenomenon on the
criminal procedure scene. There are other cases in which the parties opt to
reduce the risks and costs of the judicial process rather than completely
eliminate them. One example is the flourishing market of deals to "turn
State's evidence" whereby the state's witness submits information
incriminating others in exchange for mitigation of his punishment.3 2 From
the prosecution's point of view, the deal struck with the state's witness is a
partial reduction of the risks and costs of the criminal proceeding against
the chief defendant. In theory, the prosecution could hammer out a full plea
bargain with the chief defendant, thus precluding the risks and costs of a
trial. However, from the prosecution's perspective, the price involved (a
lenient sentence for the chief defendant) would be too high. Instead, the
prosecution prefers to partially reduce its risks and costs by recruiting
witnesses on its behalf. In exchange it pays a lower price in the form of
sentence mitigation or other benefits bestowed upon the state's witness.
Another clear example of reducing the risks and costs of a criminal trial, as
distinguished from their complete abrogation, is reflected in agreements
whereby the defendant waives his right to appeal his sentence in exchange

30

This variable can represent the interval between the "beyond a reasonable doubt"

standard of proof and the "preponderance of the evidence" standards of proof.
31 For example, from the prosecution's point of view, the level of reduction in
punishment that is required by the defendant in exchange for a full guilty plea may prove to
be too high. The prosecution may therefore prefer to conduct a less expensive fact-finding
trial rather than bear the cost in punishment mitigation involved in a full plea bargain. This

may also hold true for the defendant who, under the present model of plea bargaining, is
obliged to bear the price of full waiver of all chance for acquittal. The defendant may also

opt for a partial bargain whose inherent costs are lower-in the sense that he still retains a
possibility, even at a decreased rate, of being found innocent. These points will be illustrated
later on in the Article. See discussion infra Part II.D
32 See Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REv. 563, 563
(1999) (describing the thriving market of defendant cooperation in the federal criminal
justice system).
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for concessions from the prosecution. 33 ' The fact that such "partial
insurance" mechanisms against the outcome of the trial exist indicates the
viability of interim solutions for contending with the risks and costs of
criminal proceedings. The changes proposed in this model aim to expand
the spectrum of options available to both parties by removing an additional
stumbling block from their way-the fixed, indivisible standard of proof.
Concomitant to this discussion, an important point must be clarified:
The discussion thus far may have created the false impression that the
proposal to change the standard of proof to a negotiable variable is aimed at
opening the parties to an endless, sequential continuum of proof standards
from among which they can choose-i.e., that in accordance with the
proposed model, the parties would be able to contract for a precise degree
of probability for conviction, such as 85%, 78%, or 70%, and that this
statistical rate could be validated by the courts. This is not the case, for
there is indeed room to claim that accurate arithmetic evidentiary standards
may not be practically viable. Judicial decisions are not statistical by nature
and cannot be quantified accordingly. Courts typically lack the necessary
tools and statistical information for precise calculation of the probability of
guilt.
Instead, courts draw their conclusions from categorical
generalizations that transform legal decisions into rough estimates not
subject to accurate statistical measurement. Support for this concept can be
found in the fact that no exact statistical quantification exists for
"reasonable doubt., 34 Since from a practical point of view the exact
statistical measure has no concrete significance that can guide the courts
(and neither does the transition from "beyond a reasonable doubt" to an
80% standard of proof and thence to a 75% standard of proof), the parties
must formulate a standard of evidence that will be widely applicable. This
requires the transition to categories such as "preponderance of the
evidence" or "clear and convincing evidence." We can assume that under
the proposed system, typical agreements will not be based upon shifts of
single percentages one way or another in the standard of proof. Rather,
these agreements will have the nature of calculable conversions that do not
lend themselves to precise quantification, such as the move from the
criminal to the civil standard of proof, an agreed-upon waiver of the need
for corroborative evidence, or reversal of the burden of proof between
defendant and prosecution.
33 See John C. Keeney, The Appeal Waiver Controversy Justice Department Memo: Use

of Sentencing Appeal Waivers to Reduce the Number of Sentencing Appeals, 10 FED. SENT'G
REP. 209 (1998) (discussing the scope of sentencing appeal waiver provisions).
34 See Henry A. Diamond, Note, Reasonable Doubt: To Define, or Not to Define, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1716, 1717 (1990) (examining the normative desirability of quantifying the
"reasonable doubt standard").
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The discussion of this Article will be divided into two main parts. The
first part will explore the practical viability of the proposed model. The
discussion will be devoted to identifying some of the situations where deals
to provide concessions in the standard of proof might emerge or are likely
to be formulated. The second part of this Article will address the normative
desirability of such agreements. The legitimacy of the proposed model will
be explored in reference to existing plea bargaining practices. This requires
a brief explanation. The adoption of plea bargaining, and the legal
regulation to which it is subject,35 reflect a normative choice, the basis of
which will not be re-opened for discussion here. Rather, this choice will be
treated as an axiomatic starting point for my argument. The normative
examination of the proposed model will focus on locating the points where
the model deviates, either qualitatively or quantitatively, from plea bargains
in their present form, and on exploring the ramifications of these
dissimilarities regarding the proposed model's normative desirability.
II. VIABILITY OF THE PROPOSED MODEL
This Part is dedicated to the claim that the proposed model has
practical significance: that, under certain circumstances, the negotiating
parties will prefer the interim solutions available due to the implementation
of such a model over the existing end results of plea bargains in their
present form or full implementation of the judicial apparatus. When
examining the viability of the proposed model, one must first ask why the
parties choose to engage in plea bargaining in the first place. What utility
do they derive from such bargains, and what aims do they seek to advance
through them? Against this background one can define those situations in
which the proposed model will further each party's attainment of its goals,
as compared with the binary end solutions available at present. Therefore,
at the outset I will discuss the advantages of plea bargaining, as viewed by
both the defendant and the prosecution.
A. ADVANTAGES OF PLEA BARGAINING FOR THE DEFENDANT
The defendant's main motivation for engaging in plea bargains with
the prosecution is aimed at reducing the overall costs he faces for allegedly
committing an offense. These costs include both the criminal punishment
and its accompanying trial costs. Punishment comprises the formal legal
sanction imposed on the defendant (e.g., years of imprisonment and/or
fines) as well as reputation and opportunity costs (such as loss of income).3 6
35 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
36 See Shanya M. Sigman, Comment, An Analysis of Rule 11 Plea Bargain Options, 66
U. CHM. L. REV. 1317, 1322 (1999).
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The trial costs encompass monetary and emotional resources, the time spent
in conducting a full trial, and the cost of facing uncertainty (for risk-averse
defendants).37 By negotiating a plea bargain, the defendant can acquire a
"discount" in the criminal sanction (conviction for a lesser crime or a lighter
sentence), and also avoid the accompanying trial costs.
B. ADVANTAGES OF PLEA BARGAINING FOR THE PROSECUTION
The prosecution is restricted from a budgetary viewpoint. 38 The scope
of its resources does not allow it to conduct a full trial with regard to every
suspect against whom sufficient evidence has been amassed.3 9 Plea
bargains enable prosecutors to maintain control over their caseloads by
reducing enforcement costs per case 40 and by minimizing the risk of
acquittal. 4' Such bargains pave the way for increasing the overall number
of offenders prosecuted,4 2 thus enabling the prosecution to further its goals
of deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution. 3 In addition, plea bargains
shorten the period of time between the criminal incident and the act of
punishment."
In light of the attempt to increase general enforcement, the
prosecution's motives in plea bargaining with a particular defendant can
best be described as directed toward maximizing the expected punishment
or "cost of offense" borne by the specific defendant (within the limits of the
formal legal sanction). The prosecution will agree to enter into a plea
37 See John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 281
(1973) (discussing the effect of the defendant's attitude toward risk on the unexpected cost
of the trial option).
38 Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargainingin the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REv.

1471, 1495 (1993).
39 See Charles P. Bubany & Frank F. Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Administrative
Law for ProsecutorialDecision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 473, 483 (1976) (noting that
plea bargaining is crucial for processing and prosecuting most criminal offenders).
40 Put another way, plea bargaining enables the prosecution to obtain the highest
marginal return per case, given its budgetary constraint. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal
Procedureas a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 299 (1983).
41 Jacqueline E. Ross, Criminal Law and Procedure: The Entrenched Position of Plea
Bargaining in United States Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. Supp. 717, 717 (2006)
(claiming that plea bargaining allows the prosecution to dispose of cases efficiently).
42 F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the
Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor,the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB.
L. 189, 191 (2002).
43 The plea bargain also enables savings in "court time." See Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) ("If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the
States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of
judges and court facilities.").
44 See Douglass, supra note 7, at 439 n.6 (quoting Santobello, 404 U.S. 257 (1971)).
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bargain if the overall expected "price of the offense" paid by the particular
defendant exceeds the expected price from alternative defendants through
equal investment of resources 45 and also exceeds the expected sentence if
the particular defendant is tried, after deduction of the prosecution's trial
costs.
C. DEVIATION FROM THE CRIMINAL STANDARD OF PROOF
After defining the goals of both the prosecution and the defendant in
the resolution of the criminal case, I will now identify the circumstances
under which one can expect the proposed bargain-a horizontal stipulation
of the criminal standard of proof-to further these goals (i.e., to offer the
parties better options than the ones currently available to them: full plea
bargain or full trial according to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
of proof). As discussed above, one can define the benefits accruing to the
prosecution and the defendant on the basis of two variables: the cost of the
offense for the defendant (as defined above) and the effective evidentiary
requirements imposed on the prosecution to uphold the burden of
persuasion. It may be claimed that the benefits to the prosecution are
positively influenced by the cost of the offense and negatively influenced
by the effective evidentiary requirements for conviction. Benefits to the
defendant, on the other hand, are negatively influenced by the cost of the
offense and positively influenced by the proof requirements imposed on the
prosecution.
Within the framework of the existing plea bargain, the defendant and
prosecutor exchange elimination of proof requirements for maximal
punishment mitigation: the plea bargain will be formed when such
evidentiary waiver is more valuable, in terms of units of punishment, for the
prosecution than it is for the defendant. The proposed model, too, depends
on both parties exchanging mitigation in proof requirements for a lighter
punishment. The difference between this model and current plea bargains is
that the model under discussion is not limited to the exchange of these
variables as one indivisible block, but provides for partial and gradual
exchange of units of standard of proof for units of punishment. In light of
the feasibility of separating the "array of punishment" and the "array of
proof standard" into units, one can thus refine the definition of the utility
function of both parties in the following manner: the greater the degree of
overall punishment and the lower the standard of proof needed to uphold
the burden of persuasion, the more benefit accrues to the prosecution-and
the reverse applies with regards to the defendant.

45 Easterbrook, supra note 40, at 308-09.
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Because benefits to the parties are influenced by the degree of
punishment and the standard of proof, and because the groupings of
"punishment mitigation" and "proof standards" can be separated, it thus
becomes possible to define specific degrees of exchange-the Marginal
Rate of Substitution ("MRS") 46-for
each party between units of
punishment and "standard of proof' units. The MRS for the prosecutor
measures the number of additional units of punishment which he is
prepared to relinquish in exchange for an additional unit of reduction in the
standard of proof, in such a way that utility will not be affected. The MRS
for the defendant describes the number of units of reduction in the standard
of proof that he is willing to forgo in exchange for the reduction of an
additional unit of punishment, while maintaining a fixed level of utility.
The proposed model is based on the assumption that in some situations the
MRS of the parties between units of punishment and units of standard of
proof will equalize at an intermediate point set between a full trial (under a
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard) and a full plea bargain. As will be
demonstrated in the following Part, under such circumstances both
prosecutor and defendant would opt for partial reduction of the standard of
proof, in exchange for a lesser sentence, rather than engage in a full plea
bargain or conducting a full trial.
D. MARGINAL RATE OF SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN UNITS OF
PUNISHMENT AND STANDARDS OF PROOF
The parties' MRS between units of punishment and units of standard
of proof are influenced by a range of factors and variables. One such
variable, briefly mentioned in the example of the rape case, is each party's
subjective assessment of its chances of success at trial under various
standards of proof. Although this factor has many practical implications,
the proposed model is not limited to conditions of asymmetric information
and differential subjective evaluations. Even under conditions of full
information, the MRS of both parties may equalize at interim points due to
the effect of additional variables, such as the prosecution's marginal cost of
gathering evidence and managing the trial, the defendant's attitude toward
risk, and the signaling effects of engaging in the proposed bargain. In order
to illustrate paradigmatic situations where the proposed model would be
viable, I will examine the possible impact of each of these factors on the
MRS for the parties, and on the willingness of the prosecutor and the
defense to enter into the proposed interim deals.

46

The MRS measures the maximum amount of a good an individual is willing to give up

in exchange for an additional unit of another good, while maintaining a constant level of
utility. See ROBERT S. PYNDICK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS (6th ed. 2005).
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1. The Combination Effect of Trial Costs and the Defendant'sAttitude
Toward Risk
a. Trial Costs
The prosecution must invest resources in order to win its case in court.
Evidence does not appear of itself. Witnesses must be located and coached
before they testify. Expert witnesses and capable attorneys must be
recruited to conduct the prosecution. Due to the fact that the gathering of
evidence bears a price tag for the prosecution, the costs of trial are not
exogenous to the proof requirements: The higher the standard of proof
required to establish criminal culpability, the more resources must be
invested by the prosecution in order to meet the evidentiary demands.47 In
other words, from the prosecution's point of view, the allocation of
resources for the management of the trial and for the gathering of evidence
is contingent upon the standard of proof necessary for the establishment of
a criminal conviction. The move to a lower standard of proof, such as
"preponderance of evidence," will reduce the prosecution's cost of trial, but
only partially. The "interim" trial under this lower standard of proof will
still be more expensive than the full plea bargain, but cheaper than the full
trial according to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof. The
move to a full plea bargain, on the other hand, enables the prosecution to
save maximally on case management and evidence-gathering as the cost of
trial drops to the minimum, due to the fact that under such bargains the
prosecution is effectively exempted from the need to prove its incriminating
case. Therefore, maximum savings in trial costs will create an incentive, on
behalf of the prosecution, to move towards the end point of full plea
bargain.
The defendant, too, faces trial costs: it costs money to gather evidence
and to mount a defense. The trial is time-consuming and places emotional
burdens on the defendant. It may be claimed that when the evidentiary
demands on the defendant are very low (for example, when the
47 The gathering of some pieces of evidence requires a great investment of resources,

while obtaining or presenting other segments of evidence costs considerably less, whether in
monetary terms (such as the cost of bringing out-of-state witnesses before the court) or
otherwise (such as the emotional price paid by rape victims or children who testify). The
contribution of different pieces of evidence to incrimination varies as well. When there is a
low standard of proof, the prosecution can utilize the cheapest or most effective segments of
evidence at its disposal from an entire array of potential evidence. However, as the
evidentiary requirements increase, there is a corresponding decrease in the prosecutor's
maneuverability regarding his options, and he is obliged to use larger segments of the corpus
of available evidence. This includes more problematic evidence and more expensive pieces
of evidence, whose individual contribution to the criminal charges may be significantly
smaller.
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establishment of reasonable doubt on his part is enough for acquittal), his
trial costs will be relatively small. As the requirements of proof placed
upon the defendant increase due to the consensual reduction in the standard
of proof necessary for conviction, the defendant is obliged to delve more
deeply into his array of potential evidence. He may need evidence that is
costly to obtain and process (such as putting expert witnesses on the stand)
or whose marginal contribution to an acquittal is low. The defendant's cost
of trial and of obtaining and processing evidence will steadily increase as
the standard of proof placed upon the prosecution decreases. In other
words, it may be possible to describe the defendant's allocation of resources
for trial management as contingent upon the standard of proof. An
alternative way to describe the defendant's allocation of resources for trial
is in binary terms of "all or nothing." It may be argued that when a full plea
bargain has not been struck and a factual investigation through testimony is
conducted to determine the defendant's guilt, the defendant will seek to use
all the evidence at his disposal to establish his innocence, irrespective of the
standard of proof for conviction. This will be especially true in the frequent
instances when the defendant is represented by a public defender or when
the defendant's trial expenses are highly subsidized. The proposed model is
viable in both situations. The important point for the purpose of the
proposed model is that regardless of the defendant's reaction to the standard
of proof, maximal savings in the cost of trial will occur only at the point of
full plea bargain.
b. Attitude Toward Risk
Unlike the prosecution, however, and despite the prospect of maximal
savings in trial costs, the defendant will not always aspire to this end point.
The defendant may also be exposed to a counter force which will direct him
towards the second extreme-that of conducting a full trial under the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard (hereinafter "full trial"). This
counter vector derives from the defendant's attitude toward risk, or, more
specifically, is prevalent in cases where the defendant acts in a risk-seeking
manner. Defendants behave as risk seekers in cases where the disutility
suffered from each year of imprisonment is expected to decline over
successive years in prison. 48 This phenomenon of decreasing marginal
48

See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 21, at 3 (discussing further possible reasons for

decreasing disutility with relation to imprisonment years); see also Alon Harel & Uzi Segal,
Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics: Observations on the Neglected Role of
Uncertainty in Deterring Crime, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 276, 295-96 (1999) (claiming that
another reason for decreasing marginal utility with relation to prison years stems from the
fact that the inherent degree of utility derived from a year of freedom at an older age may be
lower than the utility the defendant can derive from a year of freedom at a younger age).
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disutility may result from a number of factors, such as the defendant's a
priori assumption that he will grow accustomed to prison life as time
passes, and thus the second year will be more bearable than the first.
Another factor is the loss of reputation. The marginal loss of reputation
may be greatest at the time of imprisonment, whereas the marginal loss as a
result of a longer imprisonment term (two years rather than one) may be
substantially lower. Also, the degree of certainty pertaining to the later
years of the sentence is lower than that of the earlier years since the
defendant is more likely to pass away over a longer time span. When these
factors are considered and the marginal cost of the second year is lower
than that of the first year, the defendant will prefer to conduct a trial in
which he faces a 50% chance of a two-year prison term over the possibility
of an agreed sentence term of one year under a plea bargain, and in this
sense he may be considered a risk seeker.49 In other words, the defendant
acts as a risk seeker when he prefers a trial over a plea bargain, given an
expected punishment in trial, calculated by the probability of conviction
multiplied by the sanction imposed upon conviction, which is equal to the
certain punishment agreed upon under the plea bargain. The defendant's
risk-seeking tendencies will create an incentive on his part to move to the
end point of full trial, since the marginal cost of the later years in the
potential prison term is lower than the marginal cost of the early years.
This vector, directed towards the full trial end point, may be balanced
against the opposing forces that work on both the prosecutor and the
defendant, leading towards the full plea bargain end point, and which
derives from the tendency of both parties to save the costs of trial. In
summation, the proposed bargain of horizontal waiver of the standard of
proof refers mainly to the category of cases in which the defendant is a risk
seeker. In those cases, the defendant will be exposed to two opposing
forces-the incentive to cut down on trial costs will work in the direction of
a full plea bargain, while his risk-seeking tendencies will create incentives
directing him toward the full trial end.
Due to these opposing forces, it becomes possible to posit situations in
which both parties would opt for interim solutions of partial reduction in the
standard of proof in exchange for a lesser sentence. In light of the above
and with the assistance of a hypothetical example, I will demonstrate how
each of the parties may prioritize the three alternatives open to them: full
49 Of course, the converse could also apply: the marginal disutility suffered by the
defendant may increase with the sentence length. This model of disutility relates to a

defendant for whom each passing year of prison life will become more unbearable than the
preceding one or for whom opportunity costs are expected to rise incrementally the longer he
is cut off from normal life. This category of cases may refer to repeat offenders, for
example.
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trial, full plea bargain in its present form, or the proposed interim model. I
will begin with situations where, given the choice to engage in the proposed
interim bargains, the parties would still opt for end solutions, conducting
either a full trial or a full plea bargain. Of course, in such cases the
proposed model has no practical ramification. From there I will move to
cases where the interim solutions would be preferred over the end options
available today-of full trial or full plea bargain.
Let us assume a hypothetical case where the sanction upon conviction
is a fifteen-year prison term, and the probability of conviction under a
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is 20%. Trial costs for the
prosecution according to such evidentiary requirements are $1000. Trial
costs for the prosecution, according to the more relaxed civil standard of
"preponderance of the evidence" would cost only $500, and a full plea
bargain would cut trial costs altogether ($0). As for the defendant, the
management of his case according to any standard of proof would cost
$300, but a plea bargain would reduce trial expenses to zero. Let us further
assume that under the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, the
probability of conviction will rise to 50%. A final assumption is that, due
to the risk-seeking tendencies of the defendant, the expected cost of
punishment for the defendant, expressed in monetary terms, is as follows:
20% probability for a fifteen-year term is the least expensive alternative,
estimated at $3400; 50% probability for a six-year term is the equivalent of
$4000; and a certain three-year term costs $5000. To simplify the
The
presentation, the data are presented in the following table.
prosecution's costs of trial are expressed in row A.
Table 1
Trial Costs Under Criminal and Civil Standardsof Proof

Prosecution's Trial
Costs
A
B
C
D
Defendant's Trial
Costs
Expected
Punishment
Defendant's
Punishment Costs

Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt
95%

Preponderance of
the Evidence 51%

Full Plea Bargain

1000
4000
1200
2000
300

500
3500
500
500
300

0
0
0
0
0

20% x 15
3400

3

50% x 6 = 3
4000

100% x 3
5000

3
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In such circumstances the move from a criminal standard of proof to
the civil standard of proof will save the prosecution $500 ($1000-$500).
However, this move will cost the defendant $600 ($4000-$3400) and
therefore this bargain will not be struck. In addition, the parties will not
engage in a full plea bargain since the move from full trial to full plea
bargain will save the prosecution $1000 and cost the defendant $1300
($1600 costs of punishment minus $300 savings on trial costs). Therefore
the parties will opt for the starting point of conducting a full trial under the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
Full plea bargains are entered into in the opposite situation. I will
return to the previous example, with a minor change: This time I will
assume the prosecution's costs of trial under the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard are $4000, whereas the costs of trial under the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard are $3500. The data are
presented in the above table. The prosecution's costs of trial are expressed
in row B. In this situation, the transition from a criminal standard of proof
to a civil standard of proof will save the prosecution $500, but cost the
defendant $600. Therefore, such a transition would not occur. However, a
full plea bargain will be struck because the move from full trial to full plea
bargain would save the prosecution $4000 in trial costs and would cost the
defendant $1300 ($1600 cost of punishment minus $300 savings on trial
costs). The range between $1301 and $3999 would enable the prosecution
to compensate the defendant, in terms of punishment, in exchange for his
guilty plea.
Alongside these situations, one can posit scenarios where the parties
will prefer the proposed deal over existing binary solutions. Once again I
will illustrate by means of the hypothetical case above. This time I will
assume that the prosecution's costs of trial under the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard stand at $1200, whereas the costs of trial under the
"preponderance of evidence" standard are $500. The data are presented in
the above table. The prosecution's costs of trial are expressed in row C.
Under the abovementioned circumstances, the transition from the criminal
standard of proof to the civil standard of proof will save the prosecution
$700. Such a transition will cost the defendant $600, and will therefore
take place. However, from this point on, the parties will not make any
progress towards a full plea bargain because the move from conducting a
trial according to the civil standard of proof to a full plea bargain will save
the prosecution only $500 and cost the defendant $700 ($1000 in terms of
punishment minus $300 in trial costs). Lacking the opportunity to enter
into the proposed interim arrangement, the parties will opt for a trial rather
than a plea bargain because a full plea bargain will save the prosecution
$1200 but cost the defendant $1300 ($1600 punishment costs minus $300

TALIA FISHER

[Vol. 97

savings on trial costs). However, in this scenario, if the parties had the
proposed option of across-the-board stipulation of the standard of proof,
they would choose to enter into an interim arrangement whereby the
prosecutor could establish criminal culpability by meeting the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof and in exchange offer
the defendant a reduction of the expected punishment, which has the
monetary equivalent of $601-$699. This point represents a compromise in
the position of each party, both with respect to the full plea bargain and
with respect to a full trial.
There may also be situations where, for lack of opportunity to enter
into the proposed interim agreement, the parties would choose to negotiate
a full plea bargain, but would also opt for the proposed interim option if one
were available. Returning to the previous example, I will make the
following set of assumptions: Conducting a full trial in accordance with the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard will cost the prosecution $2000 and
managing a trial under the "preponderance of the evidence" standard costs
the prosecution $500. The data are presented in the table above. The
prosecution's costs of trial are expressed in row D. As can be seen, the
transition from a heightened standard of proof of "beyond a reasonable
doubt" to the civil standard of "preponderance of evidence" will save the
prosecution $1500. This shift would cost the defendant $600 and will
therefore take place. However, from this point on the picture changes: The
move to a full plea bargain will not occur because the transition from the
civil standard of proof to a full plea bargain will save the prosecution $500
in trial costs but will cost the defendant $700 ($1000 costs of punishment
minus $300 savings on trial costs). When the standard of proof is a
nonnegotiable variable, and the parties lack the option of engaging in the
proposed deal, they would opt for a full plea bargain, which saves the
prosecution $2000 and costs the defendant only $1300. However, if the
standard of proof becomes negotiable, the parties would choose to engage
in the proposed deals. This would enable the prosecutor to establish guilt
by meeting the "preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof, and in
exchange offer the defendant a reduction of the expected punishment,
which is the monetary equivalent of $601-$1499. This interim point
improves the situation of each party both vis-d-vis a full trial and vis-d-vis a
full plea bargain.
2. The Effects of the EpistemologicalAssessment of Risk
A further factor, which may affect the parties' tendencies to engage in
the proposed deals, rests on their subjective assessments of the chances they
face at trial pursuant to various standards of proof. This factor depends
upon the existence of information disparities between the parties. The
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practical relevance of such considerations may be significant given that in
reality laboratory conditions of full information do not exist. In order to
isolate the effect of this factor on each party's MRS between levels of
punishment and degrees of mitigation in the standard of proof, I will
assume at this point that the costs of trial do not depend on the standard of
proof necessary for conviction and are extraneous to the evidentiary
requirements faced by each side. For example, I will assume that the costs
of gathering evidence and managing the trial are negligible. In such a case,
the standard of proof that applies at trial will be relevant only with regard to
the parties' epistemological assessment of the risk allocation between them
and their chances for success. 50
The effect of the parties' assessments of their chances for success on
their willingness to trade reduction in the standard of proof for sentence
mitigation is illustrated by the hypothetical rape case referred to above. As
I indicated, one need not necessarily assume that by transferring a certain
degree of the standard of proof from the prosecution to the defense we have
symmetrically altered each party's perception of its success rate. It may be
that the prosecutor feels that a 10% reduction in the standard of proof will
improve his chances of establishing a conviction by 30%, but the defendant
believes that by taking on an additional 10% of the standard of proof he will
increase his risk of conviction by a mere 5%. This disparity arises from the
fact that the parties are functioning under specific conditions of uncertainty.
When dealing with assessment of evidentiary material, the lack of
information is two-fold: Not only does each side lack information regarding
the strategic use that the opposing party will make of the evidence at his
disposal, but his ability to assess the specific value of the evidence he
himself possesses is also limited because the value of his evidence is a
function of the interaction likely to ensue with the evidentiary version of the
opposing party. Even beyond the lack of information regarding the
evidentiary material, the entire criminal proceeding is shrouded in
uncertainty, beginning with the existence of contradictory judicial
precedents and extending to a lack of information at certain points in time
as to the identity of the presiding judge or jury. These disparities in each
party's evaluation of the chances of success under various standards of
proof could lead to situations where the MRS between penalty reduction
50 Of course, this assumption deviates from the premise underlying the discussion in the
previous section, according to which the prosecution will react to the standard of proof in its

decision as to the allocation of resources for the management of trial. It is necessary to
assume a constant level of resource allocation to the management of the trial, regardless of
the standard of proof, in order to isolate the effect of the parties' subjective epistemological

assessments of the chances they face at trial on the MRS between the standard of proof and
the degree of punishment.
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and evidentiary concessions may induce bargains at the interim points in
such a way as to improve the position of both parties.
3. The SignalingEffects of the ProposedBargain
Another consideration that may induce the parties to prefer an interim
deal over a full plea bargain touches on the hidden signal conveyed by the
very willingness to enter into such bargains. For the defendant, entering
into a full plea bargain serves as a signal that he assumes responsibility for
the crime. From his point of view, this constitutes a negative signal.
However, his willingness to negotiate a reduced standard of proof for a
criminal conviction is likely to convey a positive signal. It can be
interpreted as a firm belief in his innocence and confidence in his ability to
establish his case, even in light of the more severe evidentiary demands that
he now faces. 51 The positive signals that he is sending to the prosecutor, the
court, and society in general can serve as an additional incentive to opt for
an interim deal.over a full plea bargain.
The prosecutor is also likely to perceive the expressive significance of
an interim deal. Hitherto I have related to the criminal sanction as a whole
without analyzing its individual components. However, in certain cases the
formal sanction is likely to be of secondary importance, subordinate to the
establishment of criminal culpability by the court and to the judicial
attachment of a criminal label to the act. In some cases, public opinion may
demand a full judicial trial clarifying the question of criminal responsibility,
whereby the defendant's conduct will be labeled in light of public
standards, morals, and ideals.52 When judicial clarification proceeding on
the question of criminal responsibility constitutes the most important basis
for the prosecutor while the punishment is less so, the prosecutor is likely to
opt for the proposed deal, whereby a criminal trial is held to determine the
question of criminal responsibility.
E. INTERIM SUMMARY
The main considerations that lead the prosecution and the defense to
formulate plea bargains arise from their desire to avoid trial costs (costs
51 Such face-saving considerations on the part of the defendant also form the basis for
nolo contendere pleas. For further discussion of the nolo contendere plea as a face-saving
device, see Mark Gurevich, Justice Department's Policy of Opposing Nolo Contendere
Pleas: A Justification,6 CAL. CRIM. L. REv. 2, 2 (2004).
52 Of course, there is room to claim that the stigmatizing effect of a conviction governed
by a relatively low standard of proof, such as "preponderance of the evidence," is not
equivalent to the stigma of conviction according to the higher evidentiary standard of
"beyond a reasonable doubt." These expressive issues will be discussed in more detail in
upcoming sections. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.b.ii.
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bargaining) and reduce inherent risks of trial (odds bargaining) 53 while
maintaining an acceptable and agreed-upon level of punishment. Under the
proposed deals for across-the-board stipulation of the standard of proof, the
parties cannot expect to fully realize these goals. The interim deals do not
obviate the need for a fact-finding proceeding, and consequently, the parties
continue to bear the costs and risks of trial. In addition, the expected
punishment borne by the defendant remains an open-ended question since
the possibility of acquittal remains intact. Given the fact that the proposed
model does not fully achieve the basic goals of the criminal negotiation, it
may be argued that it cannot constitute a realistic alternative to the existing
plea bargain. However, as I have attempted to demonstrate, the proposed
arrangement may offer the parties more attractive options for settling the
criminal dispute and realizing all of these aims than the existing end
solutions.
Underlying the full plea bargain is the assumption that situations may
arise where the value of a comprehensive evidentiary exemption transferred
from the defendant to the prosecutor, in terms of punishment units, is higher
for the prosecutor than it is for the defendant. In these cases, the parties
will find it beneficial to engage in a plea bargain whereby the defendant
pleads guilty and the sanction imposed upon him is reduced maximally.
Underlying the proposed model is the further assumption that the MRS
between units of punishment and units of exemption from the standard of
proof may equalize at the interim points between a full trial and a full plea
bargain. In such cases, a reduction in the standard of proof (as opposed to
full exemption) in exchange for a partial reduction in punishment (as
opposed to maximal reduction) may improve the position of both parties in
relation to the options currently available-either full guilty plea or full
trial.
The full plea bargain can indeed eliminate the costs and risks involved
in the criminal trial while the proposed model will only have a partial effect,
but the cost of such full savings may be too high from the point of view of
each party. From the prosecution's perspective, full evidentiary exemption
requires maximal concessions on the criminal sanction.
In certain
circumstances the prosecutor may prefer to shoulder the costs of a cheaper
trial over the costs involved with the maximal reduction of the level of
punishment. From the defendant's point of view, the full plea bargain
entails complete surrender of his prospects for acquittal. In certain
circumstances the defendant, too, is likely to prefer bearing the cost of less-

53 The terminological distinction between "costs bargaining" and "odds bargaining" can
be traced to Albert W. Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The Selective
Morality of Professor Bibas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1412, 1412 (2003).
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than-maximal reduction in the sanction over the costs incurred by complete
elimination of the prospect of acquittal. The previous discussion was
devoted to a description of the circumstances and factors which could pave
the way for the proposed interim deals. These factors include the costs of
trial, the defendant's attitude toward risk, and the parties' subjective
assessments of their prospects in court, pursuant to various degrees of the
standard of proof. Another factor relates to the expressive advantages likely
to be obtained by both prosecution and defense under the proposed model.
One cannot isolate the effect of each factor separately. However, by
grouping them together we open the door to a variety of situations and
scenarios where the proposed interim bargain could achieve optimum
results for each of the parties involved. Elimination of the barriers placed
upon stipulation of the criminal standard of proof broadens the spectrum of
choices for each party in the criminal negotiation. The proposed model
paves the way for a consensual reallocation of the risks and the evidentiary
requirements inherent in the criminal trial in a way that creates surplus
utility for both the defense and the prosecution.
III. NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS

Thus far I have focused on defining situations where the prosecution
and defense will be motivated to enter into interim deals for lowering the
standard of proof and where such deals will constitute a viable and effective
alternative to full plea bargains. In the sections that follow, I will examine
the desirability of such interim bargains and question the normative appeal
of turning the criminal standard of proof into a negotiable default rule. In
order to consider the expansion of the negotiation boundaries between
prosecution and defense, I shall begin by reviewing the rationales for and
against opening the criminal arena to contractual ordering. This issue is
discussed in the literature dealing with plea bargains, a practice which has
stirred up one of the most prominent and cardinal polemics in AngloAmerican criminal procedure.54 The main arguments for and against
negotiation in the criminal justice field will serve as a general reference
point. I will proceed to examine their validity in relation to the criminal
standard of proof and to question, in their light, whether it is possible to
54 Examples of law review articles calling for the abolishment of plea bargaining include
Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea
Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 931 (1983); Kenneth Kipnis, Plea Bargaining:A
Critic's Rejoinder, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 555 (1979); and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea
Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992). In contrast, articles favoring plea
bargains include Guidorizzi, supra note 19, at 754; and Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz,
A Reply: Imperfect Bargains, Imperfect Trials, and Innocent Defendants, 101 YALE L.J.

2011, 2015 (1992).
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justify the existing dichotomy between negotiable procedural rights and the
standard of proof considered nonnegotiable.
A. NORMATIVE EXAMINATION OF EXISTING PLEA BARGAINS
1. Considerationsfor Plea Bargaining
It is possible to justify plea bargaining and resorting to negotiation in
the criminal justice arena on three major grounds-efficiency, autonomy,
and distributive justice. 55 I will briefly touch upon each of these
considerations. The main reason for opening the criminal justice arena to
contractual ordering stems from the conjecture that plea bargains serve as
an efficient mechanism for the resolution of the criminal case.56 Like any
other deal, plea bargains are struck because they improve the positions of
the parties as compared to the status quo.57 The assumption is that since the
prosecution reflects the public interest 58 and the defense reflects the
defendant's interests, voluntary transactions between them represent pareto
improvements in the situation of both the defendant and society at large.59
Another justification for opening the criminal justice arena to negotiation
stems from recognition of the defendant's decisional autonomy 6° and his
right to exert effective control over the manner in which his fate will be
determined. 6 1 The very exposure to criminal proceedings puts substantial
limits on a defendant's range of choices.62 However, even in light of

55 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 7 (evaluating plea bargaining on considerations of
efficiency, autonomy, and distributive justice); see also Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 1975.
56 Easterbrook, supra note 7.
57 See Russel L. Christopher, The Prosecutor's Dilemma: Bargainsand Punishments, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 116 (2003).
58 Scott W. Howe, The Value of Plea Bargaining,58 OKLA. L. REV. 599, 604-05 (2005).

The agency problems that might arise will be discussed below. See discussion infra Part
III.A.2.
59 Even among the opponents of plea bargaining, many accept that it is an efficient tool
for resolving criminal disputes. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Guilty Plea: Plea
Bargaining,in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 829, 834 (Sanford H. Kadish ed.,
1983) (stating that "if a plea bargain did not improve the positions of both the defendant and
the state, one party or the other would insist upon a trial").
60 See Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 1977-78.
61 See Dix, supra note 8, at 219 (providing further discussion of the notion of defendant
autonomy).
62 See Robert E.Toone, The Incoherence of Defendant Autonomy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 621,
656 (2005):
[T]he looming presence of a pending criminal charge severely constrains the choices a defendant
can make in life. At the trial itself... the defendant has no ability to "conceive of his own goals
and policies and realize them." He is free only to choose among the options that "external
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criminal proceedings, the defendant's control over his fate and the freedom
to make use of his legal rights, including by way of waiver, must be
safeguarded. Finally, one can defend the opening of the criminal arena to
contractual arrangements on grounds of distributive justice. It may be
claimed that denying defendants the ability to transfer their procedural
rights in return for sentence mitigation has a regressive distributive effect.
Since defending oneself in a criminal trial is a costly ordeal, the prospects
of a defendant from a lower socioeconomic bracket to cast reasonable doubt
on the prosecution's case may be significantly lower than those of a
wealthier defendant. Unlike his poorer counterpart, the wealthy defendant
possesses the resources required to hire the services of a top-notch lawyer
or to recruit expert witnesses. 63 As a result, huge disparities may develop
between defendants in their ability to make effective use of the
"presumption of innocence" and other procedural safeguards to which the
trial framework entitles them.64 Denying plea bargaining puts the poorer
defendant in a double bind 65 in this respect: On the one hand, the use he can
make of his procedural rights within the trial apparatus is extremely limited
in comparison to the wealthier defendant; on the other hand, in a world
without plea bargains, where "realization" of these procedural rights is
contingent upon entrance to the trial arena, he is prevented from improving
his position by "trading" on these rights outside the trial arena.66 In this
sense, it is possible to view the closure of the criminal justice arena to
negotiations as a sort of regressive taxation placed upon defendants from a
lower socioeconomic bracket, in order to preserve the incommensurability

forces" afford him, options both created and bounded by the rules of procedure, rules of

evidence, and substantive law.
63 See Ellen Kreitzberg, Death Without Justice, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 485, 486

(1995) (claiming that insufficient funding contributes to wrongful convictions).
64 See John R. Lott, Should the Wealthy Be Able to "Buy Justice, "95 J. POL. EcON. 1307,
1309-10 (1987) (attempting to justify this phenomenon).
65 See also Margaret J. Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1925
(1987) (addressing the issue of market alienability of goods closely connected with
personhood, such as sexuality). Professor Radin claims that restricting the commensurability
of sexual services may place the seller in a "double bind" situation, if he is not provided with
alternative means to obtain the resources necessary for comfortable existence. Id.
66 See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading,Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges,
and the Production of Information, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 309 (1981) (claiming that the value
of a constitutional right is determined by its alienability). According to Easterbrook, "[a]
right that cannot be sold is worth less than an otherwise-identical right that may be sold.
Those who believe in the value of constitutional rights should endorse their exercise by sale
as well as their exercise by other action." Id. at 347.
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and the use value of the procedural rights for the general class of
defendants.67
2. ConsiderationsAgainst Plea Bargaining
Opposing the normative considerations for opening the criminal justice
arena to contractual arrangements is a series of counterarguments aimed at
limiting the practice of plea bargaining or even canceling it altogether.
From the efficiency perspective, the opening of the criminal arena to
contractual ordering may be challenged on the grounds of failures in the
market for plea bargains. 68 A major market failure is attributed to principalagent problems, which arise in plea negotiations.6 9 In the spirit of this
critique, the criminal procedure is not merely a market institution; rather, it
can be seen as a political instrument through which the prosecutor may
advance his own private agenda. Such a private agenda is liable to be
inconsistent with the public interest and may even collide with it head-on.7 °
Thus, for example, the interest of the prosecutor in high conviction rates for
professional promotion purposes may clash with the public interest in nonconviction of the innocent. In a full judicial mode, the court can oversee the
prosecutor's functioning and limit his ability to grind his own axe in
criminal proceedings. In contrast, plea bargains give the prosecutor room to
maneuver and reduce court supervision. An additional agency problem that
may arise in connection with plea bargains touches upon the tension
between the interests of the defendant and his counsel. 71 A combination of
the fact that the prosecutor does not fully internalize the public interest in
his utility function and the fact that the counsel for the defense may fail to
promote the defendant's interests may lead to two types of problematic
results. On the one hand, the plea bargaining mechanism paves the way for
the conviction of innocent persons, 72 with its accompanying costs and
67 I do not wish to claim that the gap between the rich defendant and the poor defendant
would be totally eliminated by negotiations outside the courtroom. This gap may be
reproduced, to some degree, in the plea bargaining arena, as can be seen in William M.
Rhodes, The Economics of Criminal Courts: A Theoretical and EmpiricalInvestigation, 5 J.
LEGAL STUD. 311, 336 (1976) (establishing the claim that the reduced probability of
conviction for wealthy defendants within the judicial system leads prosecutors to offer them
lower sentences in the plea negotiation context).
68 See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, CriminalJustice Discretion as a Regulatory System,
17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1988).
69 See Schulhofer, supra note 54, at 1987.
70 Peter Lewisch, Criminal Procedure,in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 241

(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
71 id.
72 See Schulhofer, supra note 54, at 1984 (discussing the dangers of convicting innocent
defendants through plea bargaining).

TALIA FISHER

[Vol. 97

negative externalities; 73 on the other hand, plea bargains may expose the
criminal to a lesser punishment than is desirable from a social perspective.
One way or another, plea bargains may impair the goals of criminal
justice-the development of a systematic and consistent punishment
policy 74-and
the goals of deterrence, 75 retribution, and incapacitation of
76
the guilty.

An additional criticism that can be leveled at the efficiency of the plea
bargaining mechanism touches upon the fact that the two sides to the deal
are positioned in a bilateral monopoly situation.77 The defendant is
prevented from offering his guilty plea to rival prosecutors in order to
obtain a better "price" (in terms of sentence mitigation),78 and, similarly, the
prosecutor can only "purchase" the specific plea of guilt from the particular
defendant. The bilateral monopoly situation sets up strategic barriers,
resulting in the fact that a perfect market for plea bargains cannot be
established. 79 An alternative analysis that also forms a source of opposition
73 See Bibas, supra note 18, at 1386.
74 A possible reaction to this criticism is that a plea bargain is the typical and prevalent
mechanism for solving criminal disputes. Accordingly, one should not dismiss outright the
development of a systematic and consistent punishment policy through the plea bargain
mechanism. See Michael E. Tigar, Forward: Waiver of ConstitutionalRights: Disquiet in
the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1970).
75 In this respect, a possible defense of plea bargaining is that even though agreeing to a
plea bargain involves mitigation of sanctions for each individual defendant, it enables the
prosecution to deal with a much larger inventory of cases. Accordingly, at the system level,
plea bargaining may reduce the severity of the sanctions, but increases the probability of
criminal punishment. In other words, the plea bargaining mechanism actually increases the
expected punishment for the commission of crime, and therefore promotes deterrence, as
compared to the alternative of exhausting the full criminal process with each individual
defendant.
76 The inefficiency of plea bargains may also be attributed to the various cognitive biases
of the negotiating parties. Due to systematic deviations from rational behavior, especially by
the defendant, one cannot assume efficient results. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining
Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2463 (2004) (providing a comprehensive
discussion of behavioristic biases in plea bargaining).
77 Eric Rasmusen, Mezzanatto and the Economics of Self-Incrimination, 19 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1541, 1583 (1998) ("[P]lea bargaining is not a situation of anonymous market
competition... but the negotiation of a relational contract ... where two parties are in a
bilateral monopoly .... ").
78 The prospective criminal may have the option to "forum shop" prior to transgression.
At this preliminary stage, he can choose what type of crime to commit and in which
jurisdiction to do it. However, as soon as he commits the crime he is bound to negotiate with
a particular prosecutor. See Easterbrook, supra note 40, at 291.
79 See Sigman, supra note 36, at 1323 (providing a comprehensive discussion of the
bilateral monopoly situation in plea bargains). It would seem that the criticism concerning
the strategic barriers resulting from the bilateral monopoly situation blurs the distinction
between the existence of obstacles in the way of arriving at a plea bargain, and the claim that
the plea agreement, when worked out, will be inefficient. The bilateral monopoly structure
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to plea bargaining practices views the prosecution as a monopsonist in this
respect-i.e., as sole purchaser of guilty pleas from a multitude of
defendants.80 The fact that the prosecutor deals concurrently with many
defendants and conducts a broad inventory of cases allows him to enjoy a
great deal of leverage over the defendant, thus enabling the prosecution to
obtain exchanges of pleas at sub-competitive prices 81 The disparate
bargaining powers between the parties to the plea negotiation raise the fear
that the errors mentioned in the previous paragraph will systematically
work to the detriment of the defendant.8 2 It is suspected that the defendant
will be tempted to confess falsely to committing crimes or to waive his
legal rights to the prosecution for too low a "price" because of the
prosecutor's exploitation of his better bargaining position.8 3
A related criticism is that negotiations in the criminal arena are
coercive by their very nature. This is due to the power disparity between
prosecution and defense, the prosecution's monopoly over punishment, and
the fact that plea bargains-along with their concomitant concessionsconcern the defendant's freedom. 4 Critics argue that as a result of the
coerciveness built into criminal justice negotiation, one cannot view it as an
expression of the defendant's free will.8 5 An opposite criticism that may be

generated against contractual arrangements in the criminal arena is that
even assuming that plea bargaining embodies the defendant's free will, one
is indeed liable to affect the ability to arrive at an agreement adversely-although given the
high percentage of success of plea bargains, even this argument is dubious. However, as
soon as the parties overcome the strategic obstacles in the way of a plea agreement, such a
bargain may be efficient. Moreover, even if it were possible to conclude that, given the
strategic obstacles standing in the way of plea bargains, their existence has no concrete
economic viability, there is nothing in this claim, in and of itself, to justify placing artificial
restrictions upon them. Quite the contrary, the only lurking danger, according to this
scenario, is the plea agreement being an unusable mechanism. Cf Roy D. Simon, Lawsuit
Syndication: Buying Stock in Justice, 69 Bus. & Soc'Y REv. 10, 12 (1989) (discussing
settlement agreements in civil litigation).
80 Standen, supra note 38, at 1472-74.
81 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1921 (providing further discussion of the
unconscionability doctrine as an argument for non-enforceability of plea bargains).
82Standen, supra note 38, at 1472-74.
83 Id. at 1473.
84 See Thomas W. Church, In Defense of "BargainJustice, " 13 LAW & Soc'v REV. 509,
509 (1979).
85 See Conrad G. Brunk, The Problem of Voluntariness and Coercion in the Negotiated
Plea, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 527 (1979) (noting problems of duress in plea bargaining); John
H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining,46 U. CHi. L. REV. 3 (1978) (discussing duressbased attacks against plea bargains); see also Michael Philips, The Question of Voluntariness
in the Plea BargainingControversy: A PhilosophicalClarification, 16 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
207 (1981) (distinguishing between legally invalid plea bargains and bargains which should
be abolished for policy considerations).
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can strongly object to the moral legitimacy of increasing the defendant's
"purchase power" in criminal justice negotiations. One can argue that
procedural safeguards and rights touching upon the criminal trial are
intended to advance public goals, such as arriving at the truth, and not
aimed at leveraging benefits for the defendant. 6 The attempt to turn such
rights into bargaining chips for the defendant, in order to bolster his
position vis-A-vis the prosecution, is not legitimate. 87 In the spirit of this
criticism, it is morally defective to make a contractual arrangement with the
defendant and increase his "buying power" by making due process or the
right to trial alienable. Finally, it is also possible to attack the opening of
the criminal justice arena to contractual arrangements from considerations
of distributive justice. In this context the argument has been raised that
those who typically suffer from overexposure to criminal punishment in the
framework of plea bargaining 88 are indigent and unsophisticated
defendants. 89
In sum, it is not surprising that the practice of plea bargaining has
stimulated one of the stormiest controversies in the area of criminal
procedure; placing criminal disputes in the hands of prosecutors and
defendants, to be settled by contractual means, can be seen as undermining
basic concepts in the moral and political philosophy of criminal law. 90
Endless discussions have been dedicated to surveying the plea bargain
phenomenon and to the examination of its normative status; yet, in point of
fact, the die has already been cast. The fact that plea bargaining has taken
root and expanded to its present magnitude indicates a normative choice in
the matter.91 Such reality recognizes the legitimacy, in principle, of plea
bargains and prefers the advantages, embodied in the opening of the
86 William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REv. 761, 785

(1989) (arguing that defendants holding Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights are not
meant to maximize their individual enjoyment of these entitlements).
87 See George E. Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modern Law
of Confessions, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 275, 335 (1975).
88 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV.
652 (1981).
89 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1912 ("The unfairness [inherent in the plea bargaining
system] disproportionately harms the poor and unsophisticated .. "); see also Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Due Processof Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 733 (1980).
90 See Alschuler, supra note 59, at 830 (claiming that plea bargaining raises fundamental
questions of sentencing policy, of the propriety of compromise in the context of determining
criminal guilt, and of the use of governmental inducements to secure waivers of
constitutional rights); see also Arenella, supra note 1, at 219 (claiming that plea bargaining
privatizes the resolution of the criminal dispute by empowering the parties to resolve it with
minimal involvement from the public and the court).
91 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (stating that plea bargaining "is
not only an essential part of the process but a highly desirable part").
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criminal justice arena to contractual ordering, over its disadvantages.92 In
the framework of the current discussion, I shall not open the debate once
more, but rather relate to the acceptance of plea bargains as a given.
Against this normative background, I shall examine whether one can justify
the borderline which currently exists between plea bargains in their present
form and the expanded version of plea bargains according to the proposed
model.
B. NORMATIVE EXAMINATION OF THE PROPOSED MODEL
Changing the criminal standard of proof to a default rule from which
the parties can negotiate deviations can be supported by the same
considerations of efficiency, autonomy, and distributive justice that form
the basis for recognizing the institution of plea bargaining. 93 Such change
is expected to actively expand the parties' range of choice by transforming
the strict binary set of options (trial according to the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard or full plea bargain) currently available to them into a
graduated range of possibilities (trial according to the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard, trial according to the "clear and convincing evidence"
standard, trial according to the "preponderance of the evidence" standard,
full plea bargain, etc.). Enhancement of the spectrum of choices and the
removal of external limitations on the content of their deals will enable the
defense and prosecution to reach results better suited to their mutual
interests. Both sides will be able to extract the maximum possible benefit
from the bargain,94 especially in those situations where the defense and
prosecution are interested in acquiring partial guarantees against the risks
'and costs involved in the management of the criminal process.
Conversely, due to the considerations previously discussed, one may
oppose the conversion of the standard of proof to a default rule, which
forms the basis for rejecting the plea bargain institution. It may be claimed
that despite the potential for mutual gain, the subordination of the standard
of proof to negotiated deviations and its transformation into a bargaining
chip held by the defendant poses a threat both to the defendant and to the
public interest. As is the case with plea bargains generally, such deals
create the risk of diluting the protection offered to the defendant in the

92 George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 859 (2000) ("Plea

bargaining may be, as some chroniclers claim, the invading barbarian. But it has won all the
same. The battle has been lost for some time.").
93 Later in the discussion, I shall elaborate on various objections to this preliminary
assumption. See discussion infra Part III.B.2
94 Easterbrook, supra note 40, at 297.

TALIA FISHER

[Vol. 97

criminal arena. 95 Furthermore, bargains for lowering the standard of proof,
like their plea bargain counterparts, may adversely affect the public interest
due to principal-agent problems. In other words, the same criticisms for
rejecting plea bargains may be aimed at the proposition to turn the standard
of proof into a default rule, which expresses an enhanced version of such
deals between the prosecution and the defense.
The fact that many of the criticisms associated with negotiating the
standard of proof also arise in the context of general plea bargaining has
ramifications for their legitimacy as possible claims against the normative
desirability of the proposed model. It is not legitimate to dismiss such
considerations in the process of accepting the current form of plea
bargaining while simultaneously embracing them as a basis for rejecting a
negotiable standard of proof. Therefore, when examining the normative
aspects of the proposed model, I will endeavor to isolate those criticisms
which are not correspondingly apparent in the general context of plea
bargaining and which cannot be formulated against plea bargains in their
present form.
At the same time, normative considerations may also apply as a matter
of degree. It is possible for a given criticism of the full plea bargain to
carry more weight and bear more validity when applied to the proposition
of changing the standard of proof to a default rule. One could justify
rejection of the proposed model, despite accepting the principle of plea
bargaining, if the proposed model proves to incorporate a higher degree of
harm to the defendant or to the public interest-if, for example, there
proves to be a heightened risk inherent in the proposed model that innocents
will be convicted or that it is more coercive for the defendant than the
existing plea bargain. In other words, beyond the qualitative differences
between the proposed model and plea bargaining, it is possible to conceive
of differences that are likely to show up on the quantitative plane and
provide reason to oppose a model that greatly facilitates plea bargaining, or
that extends existing contractual ordering in the criminal justice arena. In
addition, it is possible that certain advantages supportive of the practice of
plea bargaining will be weakened in the context of the proposed model. For
example, an argument in favor of plea bargains is that they save court time,
which is essential given the reality of a heavily burdened judicial system.
The curtailing of the duration of the criminal process and the consequent
savings in court time may be significantly smaller in the context of bargains
for the reduction of the standard of proof. The lower impact of the positive

95 See Carol Steiker, Punishment and Procedure:Punishment Theory and the CriminalCivil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 808 (1997) (discussing the importance of
procedural protection in the criminal arena).
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influences associated with contractual ordering of the criminal arena in the
context of the proposed model may provide yet another reason for rejecting
it, despite the acceptance of full plea bargains.
In conclusion, the analysis will be devoted to singling out the specific
disadvantages, both qualitative and quantitative, of the proposed model in
reference to the classic plea bargaining model. After examining the roots of
the distinction between the proposed model and the institution of plea
bargaining as currently constituted, I will attempt to clarify whether these
differences can justify a legal regime in which the standard of proof remains
non-negotiable-in which full plea bargains are recognized but deals to
lower the standard of proof in trials are not. The first and largest share of
the discussion will be devoted to isolating the qualitative differences.
1. The Root of the DistinctionBetween the ProposedModel and Existing
Plea Bargaining
The root of the distinction between the proposed model and existing
plea bargain practices is found in the manner by which the defendant
waives the right to have the charges against him proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. In the plea bargain context, the de facto waiver of this
procedural right is exogenous to the judicial process. The existing plea
bargain model eliminates the need for a full factual investigation of the case
in order to determine criminal culpability. 96 Under the proposed model, in
contrast, the waiver of the right to a "beyond a reasonable doubt"
evidentiary standard is incorporated into the judicial process and exposes
the criminal trial to structural changes. The court must still establish the
factual basis of the case through testimony and cross-examination while the
court's decision rules are simultaneously subrogated to the agreement of the
parties. In other words, both the present form of plea bargains and the
proposed model result in an agreed-upon reallocation of the risks of error
associated with the criminal process, as compared to trials conducted under
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.97 The difference is that, under

96 Plea bargains are reviewed primarily through a contractual prism. See United States v.
Sutton, 794 F.2d 1415, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating plea bargains are "contractual in nature
and must be measured by contract law standards"); see also United States v. McQueen, 108
F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1997) ("The interpretation of plea agreements is guided by contract
law, and parties to the agreement should receive the benefit of their bargain."); United States
v. Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229, 1233 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Although plea bargaining is a matter of
criminal jurisprudence, a plea bargain itself is contractual in nature and 'subject to contractlaw standards."'); Derek Teeter, Comment, A ContractsAnalysis of Waivers of the Right to
Appeal in CriminalPlea Bargains,53 U. KAN. L. REV. 727 (2005).
97 Alschuler, supra note 88, at 690 (relating to plea bargaining from the perspective of
litigation and risk allocation); see Alex Stein, The Refoundation of Evidence Law, 9 CAN.
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current plea bargains, this reallocation takes place outside of the trial arena.
The plea bargain is a manifestation of the parties' exercise of their
prerogative to establish the evidentiary foundation before the court while
leaving intact the rules of the game that define how the criminal process is
conducted. Under the proposed model, on the other hand, this reallocation
of the risk of error is inherent in the judicial process and the parties'
agreement alters the rules of the game.
Because the qualitative difference between the proposed model and
present plea bargain practices relates to the manner by which the standard
of proof is waived (through the judicial apparatus) rather than to the mere
fact of its waiver, it follows that the arguments that could be raised against
the proposed model must focus on the criminal process itself.
2. Possible Objections That Can Be Directed at the ProposedModel
The following sections will be devoted to the central objections that
might 98 be leveled at the proposition to change the criminal standard of
proof to a default rule. I will initially examine the connection between the
standard of proof and between the functional goals and very nature of the
criminal trial. 99 I will then demonstrate how granting the prosecution and
the defense the ability to deviate from the criminal standard of proof might
adversely affect the essence of the criminal process and the objectives
achieved in its framework. The discussion will be divided between the two
central paradigms that prevail in criminal justice theory-the deontological
paradigm and the utilitarian paradigm.
a. Deontological Objections
According to the Kantian paradigm, the defendant is a subject in the
criminal process and does not serve as its object. 100 Accordingly, the only
question to be determined in the criminal trial is that of the defendant's
guilt-a question that must be answered with the highest possible degree of

J.L. & JURIS. 279, 323-27 (1996) (discussing the connection between risk allocation and
rules of evidence).
98

Since the proposition to change the standard of proof to a negotiable variable has never

before been examined, all the criticisms that I will level against it are inherently
hypothetical. The references in the footnotes that follow relate to objections raised in
relation to tangential, rather than identical, issues.
99 See George S. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-ofPersuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880 (1968) (providing a
comprehensive study of the development of proof requirements in the criminal arena and the
rationales for the criminal standard of proof).
100 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 (John Ladd trans.,
1965).
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certainty. Any lowering of the evidentiary standard that might deliberately
and systematically lead to the conviction of an innocent person damages the
moral legitimacy of the criminal proceeding.'' The central objective of
criminal procedures and rules of evidence is to protect the innocent from
wrongful conviction. 0 2 Here lies the deontological basis for mandating that
proof of culpability in criminal proceedings be set "beyond a reasonable
doubt."
In light of the above, the deontological criticism that may be leveled
against the proposed model becomes clear: any deviation from the original
allocation of risk in the criminal procedure has the effect of deliberately
exposing the defendant to wrongful conviction and harms the procedure's
legitimacy by turning the defendant into an object, rather than subject, of
the procedure. 0 3 The fact that the lowering of the standard of evidence
under the proposed model results from the consent of the defendant and
serves his own benefit is immaterial. One cannot use criminal punishment
04
to further external social ends, including the welfare of the defendant.1
It is true that the existing model of criminal proceedings is not immune
to the possibility of wrongful convictions. However, according to the
deontological paradigm, the moral legitimacy of the process is determined
by the steps taken to prevent such wrongful convictions and not by the end
result. In this sense, the two following scenarios are not tantamount under
deontological reasoning: (1) a defendant wrongfully convicted under the
existing "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard who faces a ten-year
sentence; and (2) a parallel situation under the proposed model, in which
ten innocent people are wrongfully convicted under a standard of proof

101Rinat Kitai, Protectingthe Guilty, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1163, 1186 (2003).
102 ADRIAN A.S. ZUCKERMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 125 (1989).
103 Kyron Huigens, Punishment and Crime: On Compromise Punishment Theory, 2005
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437, 440 (2005) (discussing the deontological approach to criminal
punishment, most notably advocated by Immanuel Kant); see also Charles H. Koch, Jr., A
Community of Interest in the Due Process Calculus, 37 HouS. L. REV. 635, 696 (2000); Erik
Liliquist, Recasting ReasonableDoubt, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 140 (2002).
104 See Bibas, supra note 18, at 1362, 1384 n. 116 ("Unless one 'has committed a crime'
and been found guilty and punishable, no amount of benefits can justify punishment."); see
also Lillquist, supra note 103, at 140 ("[A] retributivist might object that no amount of
utility or disutility can be attached to an erroneous conviction."). In a similar vein, according
to Kant,
even if civil society were to dissolve itself with the consent of all its members . . . the last
murderer in prison would first have to be executed in order that each should receive his deserts
and that the people should not bear the guilt of a capital crime through failing to insist on its
punishment.
The Metaphysics of Morals, in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 131, 156 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B.

Nisbet trans., 1991).
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based on the "preponderance
of the evidence" and sentenced to one year of
105
imprisonment each.
Under the deontological approach, the difference between the two
scenarios is apparent even if we assume that the two end results are
substantively identical (assuming, for instance, that each defendant incurs
zero costs for the stigma of a criminal conviction, ignoring costs of trial for
each defendant, and assuming a fixed marginal cost per each year of
imprisonment).10 6 The material difference between a situation where a
defendant is wrongfully convicted according to the maximum evidentiary
standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" (and for which he receives a
lengthy sentence) and one in which several innocent people are convicted
according to a lower standard of proof (and for which they each receive a
more lenient punishment) lies in the fact that the first conviction is not a
systematic part of the criminal proceedings, but rather is a regrettable
mistake, whereas the latter convictions are built into the process'0 7 and are
the product of deliberate action. 108
In conclusion, in the spirit of the deontological approach, the criminal
process is distinguished from the model of civil litigation. The aim of the
criminal process is not to efficiently settle a dispute between the
prosecution and the defense. Rather, it is intended to determine the right of
the state to label defendants as criminals, to deprive them of their freedom,
105 See Alschuler, supra note 88, at 714 (discussing the claim that it is worse to convict
ten innocent defendants and sentence them to one year of imprisonment each following a
plea bargain than to convict one innocent defendant mistakenly and sentence him to ten
years).
106 Clearly, a comparison in which one sentence for ten years is considered the equivalent
of ten sentences of one year each does not take into account the reputational costs associated
with criminal conviction or the different attitudes of defendants regarding risk. A more
realistic scenario, which takes these factors into consideration, would change the balance
between the two end results. For example, one sentence of ten years might realistically be
equivalent to two-and-one-half sentences of one year each. This point, however, is not
critical to the structure of the above argument. The claim is that, under the deontological
point of view, differences between situations with identical endpoints persist, due to their
different starting points.
107 Bibas, supra note 18, at 1384 ("There is something profoundly troubling about
knowingly facilitating injustice, more so than inadvertently allowing it to happen.").
108 Another stratum of Kant's philosophy can also support opposition to the proposed
model by considering the systematic dilution of criminal sanctions. According to Kant, not
only does guilt present a necessary condition for punishment, it must also be appropriate.
Regarding the criminal as a subject and honoring his choice requires that the punishment fit
the crime as an outcome of the conviction. It is possible to attack the proposed model from
this perspective as well, insofar as the criminal process becomes a tool for the systematic
mitigation of criminal sanctions, in such a way as to damage the Kantian principle of
equality. See generally Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Kant on Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment,
18 LAW & PHIL. 407 (1999) (discussing Kant's claim).
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and to impose suitable criminal sanctions upon them.'0 9 The basic purpose
of the criminal process is to legitimize criminal punishment, not to promote
the welfare of the defendant or further social aims.
Enhancing the
defendant's exposure to risk of wrongful conviction, and placing the
procedure in the hands of the prosecution and defense for their own benefit,
negates the moral legitimacy of the criminal process and its concomitant
punishments. It converts the criminal process and its related sanctions into
tools for achieving extraneous goals and, in so doing, harms the human
dignity of the defendant.
b. Utilitarian Objections
As mentioned above, the deontological objection that can be raised
against the proposed model is that converting the criminal standard of proof
into a default rule will cause moral damage which cannot be
counterbalanced by its benefits. The utilitarian approach stems from a
different underlying assumption, under which the costs involved in
applying a lower standard of proof (and the concomitant conviction of
innocent people) can and should be balanced against its benefits. The
possible utilitarian objection that can be leveled at the proposed model is
therefore of a different nature. It will touch upon the claim that the costs
involved in lowering the standard of evidence in criminal proceedings are
expected to exceed the benefits that will accrue from such a transition.
In order to examine the costs embodied in the transition to a default
standard of proof in criminal cases and to formulate the theoretical
utilitarian criticism of the proposed model, I shall survey the functional
goals that the criminal process is intended to accomplish and show how
applying the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof helps to
promote them. The sections that follow will demonstrate how changing the
criminal standard of proof to a default variable might adversely affect each
of those ends, as well as how such damage is specific to the proposed model
and does not exist under current plea bargaining practices.
i. The Object of the Trial in Determining Criminal Culpability
Utilitarianism views punishment in a prospective manner. Punishment
of crime is a necessary evil, to be imposed only in situations where it is
expected to promote public welfare by furthering deterrence, incapacitation,
and rehabilitation.' 10 Accuracy in the criminal verdict and in the imposition
109

See Fletcher, supra note 99, at 890.

110Tom Stacy, Changing Paradigms in the Law of Homicide, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1007,

1026 (2001). The utilitarian approach is distinct from the deontological approach, whose

point of view is retrospective.
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of punishment promotes these social goals,"' whereas inaccurate verdicts
impair them. Thus, wrongful convictions waste limited punitive resources
and result in sub-participation in lawful activity, for fear of being
nevertheless found guilty. Moreover, exposure to the risk of false
conviction diminishes the efficacy of the deterrence model by lowering the
marginal cost of choosing to engage in criminal behavior. 112 That is, in
situations where innocent people are systematically exposed to the risk of
criminal sanctions, the "price" of criminal activity becomes cheaper in
relation to non-criminal activity than in situations where the threat of false
conviction is not prevalent. 1 3 Conviction of the innocent will also allow
the real offender to continue roaming the streets and, as a byproduct,
prevent his rehabilitation. In the spirit of the utilitarian approach,
punishment of criminals-and only criminals-is what advances the ideals
of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 14
Like wrongful
convictions, wrongful acquittals also impair the attainment of the goals
upon which criminal punishment is based. False acquittals result in underdeterrence because prospective offenders learn that "crime pays." 115 The
continued freedom of criminal offenders exposes the public to danger and
prevents the criminals' rehabilitation.
All of these outcomes have
ramifications for the main goal of the criminal process. Under the
utilitarian approach, the criminal trial aims to convict the guilty while
acquitting the innocent. 1 6 In other words, the institutional function fulfilled
by the criminal verdict is not the mere allocation of convictions and
acquittals. Such a decision must be accurate and must rely upon factual
truth in its broadest sense. The connection to actual occurrences constitutes
the foundation of the judicial decision. Without this link to the truth, the
111In this sense, accuracy in the judicial outcome contributes to deterrence in the same
manner as does increasing criminal sanctions or raising the level of enforcement. See Louis
Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
307, 348 (1994).
1' See id.
113 Lillquist,

supra note 103, at 135 (claiming that an erroneous conviction decreases the
deterrent effect of the punishment). "If an individual already knows that she will run some
chance of being punished regardless of whether or not she engages in the activity, the cost of
the sanction decreases." Id.
114 See Kitai, supra note 101, at 1181.
115 See Kaplow, supra note 111, at 348 ("[G]reater accuracy-holding sanctions and
enforcement effort constant-increases the likelihood that the guilty are sanctioned rather
than mistakenly exonerated. Thus, individuals contemplating whether to act expect the
likelihood of sanctions to be higher if they commit the harmful act.").
116 See Jerome Hall, Objectives of FederalCriminal ProceduralRevision, 51 YALE L.J.
723, 728 (1942) (claiming that criminal procedure is "designed from inception to end, to
acquit the innocent as readily, at least, as to convict the guilty" and discussing the inherent
tension between these two objectives).
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criminal process does not have the power to accomplish its functional goals
of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
However, error avoidance constitutes only one component of accurate
Another crucial variable relates to error allocation.,7
adjudication.
Utilitarian circles assume that the harm inherent in the two types of errorwrongful conviction and undeserved acquittal-is not equivalent. The
social cost of the conviction of an innocent person is substantially higher
than an undeserved acquittal." 8 The most well-known expression of this
maxim is exemplified in the Blackstone Ratio, according to which it is
"better that ten guilty persons escape than that one person suffer."'1 9 In
light of this calculation, maximization of social utility requires that these
two types of error be allocated in a manner reflective of the specific weight
of the harm they embody. The notion of accuracy underlying the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard is thus aimed at reducing the likelihood of
erroneous convictions, even at the cost of increasing the total number of
erroneous verdicts. 120 It serves to allocate the risk of error between the
defense and prosecution in a manner that promotes errors in favor of the
defendant at the expense of errors in favor of the prosecution. 121 Inother
words, according to the utilitarian approach, the evidentiary standard of
allocation of these two
"beyond a reasonable doubt" reflects the optimal
22
procedure.
criminal
the
in
error
distinct types of
Against this backdrop, one can understand the unique harm the
proposed model may inflict upon the determination of criminal culpability,
which is at the heart of the judicial process. The existing forms of plea
bargains render the need for a judicial decision of the question of criminal
culpability redundant through the effective elimination of the dialectic clash

117 See

Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,91
COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1406-07 (1991) ("[B]ecause no set of procedures can eliminate all
erroneous outcomes, any conception of accuracy must also address how errors should be
allocated as between erroneous convictions and acquittals.").
118See Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, On the Degree of Confidence for

Adverse Decisions, 25 J. LEGAL

STUD.

27, 34 n. 11 (1996).

352 (1769); see
also Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997) (discussing the
Blackstone Ratio as well as alternative ratios in the equation of the acquittal of the guilty
versus the conviction of the innocent).
120 Stacy, supra note 117, at 1372.
121 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
119 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 408-17 (1973); see also Schauer & Zeckhauser, supra
note 118, at 34.
122 Lillquist, supra note 103, at 89 (claiming that the traditional justification for the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is premised on the utilitarian trade-off between
mistaken convictions and erroneous acquittals).
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between the versions of the prosecution and defense. 123 Under the proposed
bargains for lowering the standard of proof, however, the court is forced to
decide between the parties' contradictory versions of the issue of
culpability. Additionally, the rules governing the evidentiary standard on
which such judicial decision is premised are altered and subjected to the
stipulation of the parties. Such negotiated reduction of the standard of
proof decreases the risk of false acquittal (considered to be less costly for
society) at the expense of raising the risk of false conviction (which entails
more substantial social costs).
In addition, it may be argued that the negotiated intervention of the
prosecution and defense, in the manner by which criminal culpability is
determined, not only raises the probability of false convictions, but also
changes the very nature of the judicial verdict. It transforms its basis from a
statement about actual events to a statement about the evidence. 2 4 In his
well-known article1 25 criticizing the use of statistical evidence, Professor
Nesson argued that expressly stating the risk of error by inserting such
elements of "probability," "risk," or "luck"'' 26 into the heart of the judicial
decision-making process undermines the behavioral message that the legal
verdict imparts. It weakens the link between criminal culpability and actual
guilt, thus undermining deterrence and impairing the verdict's capacity to
induce individuals to internalize the instruction of the law in their primary

123

See Edward L. Rubin, Trial by Battle, Trial by Argument, 56 ARK. L. REV. 261, 291

(2003) (describing plea bargaining as an alternative to trial by argument).
124 See William J. Brennan, Jr., The CriminalProsecution: Sporting Event or Questfor
Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279 (1963) (discussing the dangers of conceiving the criminal
trial as a probabilistic game); see also Robert F. Cochran, "How Do You Plead, Guilty or
Not Guilty? ": Does the Plea Inquiry Violate the Defendant's Right to Silence?, 26 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1409, 1412 (2005) (enumerating the negative consequences of plea inquiry and
claiming that a false "not guilty" plea may serve as proof "that the criminal trial is merely a
game, far removed from concepts of truth and justice. At best, the legal system is an 'Alice
in Wonderland' world, where words do not mean what they seem to mean").
125 See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1357, 1359 (1985) (arguing that probabilitybased verdicts fail to formulate a statement about actual events, and that the criminal trial
must be perceived as reflecting factual happenings, in order to further deterrence and gain
public acceptance).
126 See Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 603, 610 (1985)
(providing a clear example of the penetration of elements of "risk and luck" into judicial
decision-making by discussing the case of a New York City judge who flipped a coin in
order to determine whether to sentence a defendant to twenty or thirty days in jail); see also
Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, The Economics of the Law of CriminalAttempts: A VictimCentered Perspective, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 299, 321 n.49 (1996) (discussing the objection to
introducing the element of luck into the criminal process).
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activities.127 When judicial decisions of criminal culpability cease to be
linked to factual truth and become instead the result of probabilistic
speculation and negotiated risk allocation between the
parties, they might
28
render the basic message of deterrence less effective.1
ii. The Expressive Task of the Criminal Process
Beyond its task of determining criminal liability for deterrence
129
purposes, the criminal process also serves a communicative function.
Expressive theories of law regard the criminal trial as a mechanism for
transmitting societal messages. 130 The criminal process embodies the most
prominent meeting point between the individual and the State, and between
13
the private voice and the voice of the collective ,I.,,
1 In this sense,
criminal law and the criminal trial are natural arenas for clarification of and
reflection on the social value scale. Labeling certain behaviors as
"criminal" serves to grant one moral approach precedence over
contradictory visions of justice. Given the significance of criminal law,
criminal conviction also serves an expressive function: it broadcasts a
message of moral opprobrium to the wrongdoer himself, on his criminal
activity, and on the system of values that such activity represents. The
conviction is intended to harness moral condemnation of the offender and to
expose him to social sanctions and opportunity costs. The application of
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of evidence aids the realization of
these expressive purposes of criminal procedures and convictions. The

127

See also Laurence Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of

John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371, 387 (1970) (arguing that compromise-probabilistic
verdicts place an explicit tag price on an innocent person's liberty). But see Daniel Shaviro,
Statistical-ProbabilityEvidence and the Appearanceof Justice, 103 HARV. L. REV. 530, 55354 (1990) (making a case for greater reliance on statistical evidence).
128 See Nesson, supra note 125, at 1359, 1366.
129 See Martin Sabelli & Stacey Leyton, Train Wrecks and Freeway Crashes: An
Argument for Fairnessand Against Self Representation in the CriminalJustice System, 91 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 161, 209 (2000).

According to expressive theories, law not only has a deterrent effect but also
influences social behavior in an indirect manner: law in general and the legal process
specifically transmit messages regarding a community's shared visions of justice. Law
crowns and sustains society's normative commitments. In turn, this leads to the reinforcing
and shaping of social norms. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert,
91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 471 (1997).
131 Sabelli & Leyton, supra note 129, at 209. For further discussion of expressive
theories of law, see Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law:
A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1523-24 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, What Do
Alternative SanctionsMean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal
Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
130
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criminal standard of proof preserves the stigmatizing effect of criminal
conviction. It assures maximal exactitude of the criminal conviction as
reflecting de facto guilt, and thus preserves the capacity of the criminal trial
mechanism to communicate a message of moral blame and to generate
feelings of132 indignation towards a person and behavior defined as

"criminal."

Turning the criminal standard of proof into a default rule is liable to
impair these expressive goals. It can be expected to dilute and weaken the
communicative value of criminal convictions in a way that does not occur
under the current plea bargain system. Existing plea bargain practices allow
for "acoustic separation" 133 between the public image of the process for
achieving criminal conviction and its actual practice. Although most
criminal sentences under the existing system are in fact reached outside the
courtroom-through plea bargaining-the system does not showcase these
situations but rather emphasizes full criminal trials and their tremendous
procedural demands. Plea bargains are negotiated between the prosecutor
and the defendant, far from public view. Through this acoustic separation,
the system is able to continue communicating the message that criminal
liability is most reliable and strictly contingent upon proof "beyond a
reasonable doubt." That is, the existing plea bargain system makes it
possible to preserve the public ethos of criminal process and conviction, in
theory, and to achieve a mass of convictions through the loosening of the
procedural constraints attached to this process, in practice. The proposed
model, on the other hand, eliminates the abovementioned separation.
Implementing the proposed deals means positing in the public view a
criminal trial in which the question of criminal liability is decided according
to a lowered standard of proof. The greater degree of uncertainty with
regard to the guilt of the supposed offender will lead to dilution of the
criminal conviction and make it a less valuable labeling mechanism. The
dilution also stems from epistemological considerations. 134 There is room
to claim that human information processing mechanisms are not equipped
Acceptability of
to deal with "probable truths" or "half-truths."
132

The Supreme Court has stated, "Itis critical that the moral force of the criminal law

not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are
being condemned." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); see also Steiker, supra note
95, at 808.
1331 borrowed the term "acoustic separation" from Professor Dan-Cohen's well known
article which relates to a different divide-that between decision rules and conduct rules.
See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
CriminalLaw, 97 HARV. L. REv. 625 (1984).
114See F.S.C. Northrop, The Epistemology of Legal Judgments, 58 Nw. U. L. REv. 732
(1964) (explaining the all-or-nothing principle in legal judgments from an epistemological
perspective).
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determinations of criminal culpability, for stigmatizing purposes, is
conditional upon the court producing binary, clear-cut messages of guilt or
innocence. Decisions such as "70% certainty of guilt" or "conviction on the
balance of probabilities" are too vague.
In sum, implementing the proposed model, which paves the way for a
negotiated reduction in the evidentiary standards, is liable to damage the
public ethos of criminal proceedings and consequently to harm the social
condemnation associated with criminal culpability. The public may be
reluctant to impose various social sanctions upon the wrongdoer and subject
him to moral indignation.
iii. The Role of Criminal Proceedings in the Proper Conceptualization of
the Judicial Craft
In addition to the objectives discussed above, the criminal process
plays an instrumental role in the proper configuration of the craft of
judging. In order for courts to fulfill their roles in a liberal society, their
work must be properly structured.135 Judicial decision-making must be
conceptualized as searching for truth and justice and must be in line with
the criteria of rationality, accuracy, and fairness. 136 The existing practice of
plea bargaining does not impair the proper conceptualization of judicial
decision-making because the mutual agreements on the question of criminal
liability take place outside the courtroom. In this sense, current plea
bargaining practices preserve the clear dichotomy between two types of
solutions to criminal disputes: the contractual solution, in the form of plea
bargains,137 and the legal-public solution, in the form of criminal trials that
reflect judicial decision-making.
Due to the existence of such clear
boundaries between the "world of agreement" and the "world of justice,"
the present form of plea bargaining does not "stain" the perception of the

135 See

Lauren K. Robel, Private Justice and the FederalBench, 68 IND. L.J. 891, 901

(1993); see also United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 204 (1995) ("There may be
some evidentiary provisions that are so fundamental to the reliability of the factfinding
process that they may never be waived without irreparably 'discrediting the federal
courts."').
136 See United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 1985) ("No doubt there are
limits to waiver; if the parties stipulated to trial by 12 orangutans the defendant's conviction
would be invalid notwithstanding his consent, because some minimum of civilized procedure
is required by community feeling regardless of what the defendant wants or is willing to
accept.").
137 The contractual solution may also be founded on extra-legal parameters, such as the
negotiating skills of the parties involved. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It
Anyway?: A Philosophicaland DemocraticDefense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO.
L.J. 2663, 2663 (1995).

TALIA FISHER

[Vol. 97

craft of judging. 38 The proposed model, on the other hand, might blur the
lines between negotiated settlements and "public-regarding justice," 3 9 that
is, between private and public devices for the resolution of the criminal
case. The agreement between the parties regarding the standard of proof
changes the judicial decision-making process into a private, local, and
decentralized enterprise. 40 Making the court collaborate at the altar of
efficiency to sacrifice the precision and fairness of criminal convictions is
liable to affect the proper conceptualization of judicial decision-making in a
way that harms the system's ability to function properly. In sum, one may
reject the proposed model on the basis of the public interest in defending
the proper conceptualization of the judicial role. 14' There is room to claim
that, in a world where the possibility for negotiated settlement of the
criminal case exists, the judicial process must remain a residual normative
alternative and be impervious to private stipulations by defense and
prosecution.
The case can also be presented from a slightly different perspective:
that of public confidence in the judicial system. There is room to claim that
public trust is conditional upon conserving the basic outlines of the judicial
decision-making process, as aimed at precision and ferreting out the
truth.142 Plea bargaining, in its current form, paves the way for the
preservation of this notion. Even though, from a practical standpoint, most
plea bargains exhibit a clear inclination on part of the system for efficiency
over precision, this preference is not exposed to public scrutiny. Current
plea bargains allow for the assumption that the parties have the best access
to the information underlying the factual occurrence and, accordingly, that
the agreement of criminal liability they reach reflects this truth. 14' The
proposed model, on the other hand, may undermine the public image of the
criminal trial. Its adoption is a blunt declaration that a judicial decision
may well be affected by inaccuracy-that the truth is not the only light held
138 Of course, the dichotomy is not complete, in the sense that plea bargains are
formulated in the shadow of the criminal trial.
139 Tracey L. Meares, What's Wrong with Gideon, 70 U. CHI.L. REv. 215, 219 (2003).
140 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 137, at 2663.
141 See Dix, supra note 8, at 217.
142 See Nesson, supra note 125, at 1358 (arguing that a central goal of the criminal

procedure is to induce public confidence in the legal system through the formulation of
acceptable verdicts aimed at revealing factual happenings); see also Thomas Weigend, Is the
Criminal Process About Truth?: A German Perspective, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 157,
172 (2003) (arguing that a judicial system which openly abdicates its claim for truth will lose
credibility with the public).
143Weigend, supra note 142, at 172 ("[L]egal systems that in fact leave the outcome of a
case to the unrestricted disposition of the parties cling to the theory (or, indeed, the fiction)
that the parties know best about the 'truth,' and that, therefore, whatever they agree upon
will be closest to the (substantive) truth.").
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up to the court and that it may retreat in the face of agreement between the
parties. Exposure of these inherent tensions within the court's rulings may
undermine the public's faith in the judicial system. As soon as the conflict
between "truth" and "agreement" becomes visible, and the courts are
perceived as preferring agreement to truth, public trust in the judiciary may
well be lost.
In sum, the utilitarian case that can be made against the alienability of
the criminal standard of proof is that changing the standard of proof into a
default rule is bound to cause a series of negative externalities.1 44 These
external influences are distinct from the costs embodied in the mere waiver
of the right to have the accusations against the defendant established
beyond a reasonable doubt (as exists under the current plea bargain model),
and are specific to the waiver of this right via the trial mechanism. 45 A
possible utilitarian criticism of the proposed model is that the specific
external costs associated with the application of a negotiable standard of
proof will be higher than the aggregate benefits generated by such a
model. 146
144

See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and

Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (providing a
classic explanation of inalienability from a negative externalities perspective).
145 See King, supra note 2, at 130 (providing a detailed discussion of the effect defendant
waivers of trial rights have on third party interests); see also Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Let's
Make a Deal: Waiving the Eigth Amendment by Selecting a Cruel and Unusual Punishment,
32 CoNN. L. REV. 615, 647 (2000) (providing an analogous claim against waiver of the
Eighth Amendment right against brutal punishment).
146 This utilitarian objection touches upon a broader claim that can be formulated against
the proposed model attacking the defendant's "ownership" of the procedural right to a
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof. It may be argued that the procedural
features of the criminal trial in general and the standard of proof in particular are designed to
protect the public interest and are, therefore, "owned" by the prosecution on behalf of society
at large. Accordingly, the defendant is not authorized to waive this evidentiary standard on
the public's behalf. This "public-regarding justice" model of the criminal procedure
prevailed in the Anglo-American world until the second half of the nineteenth century. See
Meares, supra note 139, at 219. This model highlighted the criminal trial's function as an
arena for the settlement of conflicting public interests and as a domain characterized by state
coercion. Toone, supra note 62, at 644-45. The procedural and evidentiary features of the
criminal process were also viewed from a public perspective as designed primarily for
protection of social interests in the liberty and well-being of all citizens. These rights were
not viewed as belonging to the defendant and his to exercise or forfeit as he deems fit; rather,
the defendant's role was reduced to that of a beneficiary of procedural and evidentiary
safeguards. Id. However, the late nineteenth century marked a turning point in the
perception of the criminal procedure. From this point on, we are witness to an ongoing
process of individualization of procedural rights. See King, supra note 2, at 120. The most
prevalent manifestation of this transformation is the practice of plea bargaining, which
acknowledges the defendant's ability to control and waive the most central procedural rights
in the criminal sphere, including the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to a
jury trial.
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3. Normative Justificationsof the ProposedModel
Normative support for the proposed model and possible answers to the
objections that I have leveled against it in previous sections are anchored in
considerations of efficiency and autonomy. The following discussion will
be devoted to each of the arguments. First, I will clarify the argument that
changing the criminal standard of proof to a default rule is likely to enhance
social benefits and better achieve the goals of the criminal process. In this
way, I intend to reply to the utilitarian criticisms presented in the previous
sections. The second part of the discussion will contend with deontological
criticism, presenting an alternative vision of the defendant's autonomy in
the criminal process.
a. Utilitarian Justification
There is room to contest the premise, outlined above, that negotiated
deviations from the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof are
necessarily at odds with the realization of the goals of the criminal trial.
The following section will be devoted to establishing the claim that
lowering the standard of proof is actually compatible with the goals that
criminal proceedings must achieve and will increase social welfare. At the
outset of the discussion, I will adopt the goals of the criminal process as
presented thus far and explain how opening the standard of proof to
stipulation by the parties will help realize these goals. In other words, I will
demonstrate how applying the proposed model would achieve the object of
the judicial process with regard to the determination of criminal liability by
enriching the concept of criminal culpability, how this model would fulfill
the expressive task of the criminal trial by enhancing the amount of
information provided by the criminal conviction, and, finally, how the
model would preserve the proper conceptualization of the craft of judging.
As a second step, I will attempt to redefine the functional goals of the
criminal process in a broader fashion than presented previously. After
formulating alternative goals for criminal procedure, I will demonstrate how
the proposed model can be expected to help realize them as well.
i. Realizing the Object of the Trial in Determining Criminal Culpability
The question of criminal liability pertains to the most complex and
convoluted categories dealt with by law. The imposition of criminal
liability requires that a wide variety of variables-evidentiary, legal, moral,
147
and emotional-be evaluated and congregated into a single grouping.
The present system dictates that the structure of the criminal verdict reflects
147 See Weigend, supra note 142, at 170.
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the manifold aspects of criminal liability in strict, binary, one-dimensional
terms of full guilt or acquittal. It may be claimed that the conceptualization
of criminal liability in binary and dichotomous terms flattens and steamrolls
the complexity characteristic of this question at both the normative and
evidentiary levels. In contrast, the proposed model paves the way for more
complex and sophisticated answers to the question of criminal liability, at
least with regard to the evidentiary dimension on which it is based. It
enhances the spectrum of standards of criminal liability, beginning with the
existing heightened standard of criminal culpability "beyond a reasonable
doubt," but adding lower standards of criminal liability, based on "clear and
convincing evidence" or on the more lenient standard of "preponderance of
the evidence." By creating multiple standards of criminal culpability, this
model can accurately reflect all the evidentiary gray areas that characterize
criminal acts. In this sense, its establishment enables the question of
criminal liability to be transformed from a qualitative question of "yes or
no" to a quantitative one of "how much." It is true that this transformation
is partial in the sense that it allows for refinement of the judicial verdict and
the concept of criminal liability, but only with regard to the underlying
evidentiary dimension. The normative aspect of the question of criminal
liability remains binary and continues to be conducted between the two
poles of full culpability and innocence. In other words, there is indeed a
basic distinction between a verdict dealing with (full) criminal liability of
partial probability and a verdict that deals with partial criminal liability.
The proposed model paves the way for verdicts of the first kind, which
depend on an evidentiary base, but this is not sufficient to establish the
essential infrastructure for a verdict of the second kind. However, the very
conceptualization of criminal liability on a hierarchical scale, even if only in
connection with the evidentiary stratum, constitutes the first step towards
opening a plural and gradual discourse in relation to the normative question
as well. This discourse may ultimately lead to a more sophisticated
conceptualization of the question of criminal liability, both at the
evidentiary level and on the normative plane; it may lead to verdicts that are
fuller and more accurate than the simplistic attempt to present criminal
liability in binary terms while creating a clear and unequivocal borderline
between guilt and innocence.
One can also refute the criticism against the proposed model by
challenging the manner in which the current model of the judicial process
fulfills its goal of accuracy in determining criminal liability. At a time
when the overwhelming majority of criminal cases are resolved by plea
bargaining rather than a full-fledged trial based upon the merits of the
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indictment,148 such deals cannot be regarded as a mere footnote to the
criminal justice system. Plea bargains constitute an integral part of the
system. 149 In addition, plea bargains are reviewed primarily from a
contractual perspective. 150 Judicial review of their evidentiary basis is
rather negligible. As a result, under the present system, court decisions
regarding criminal liability, which rely primarily on agreements reached
between prosecution
and defense, are liable to be limited in terms of
51
precision.1
ii. Refinement of the Expressive Task of the Criminal Process
As I have described previously, a possible objection to the proposed
model touches upon the dilution of the expressive value of criminal
culpability under a system which enables negotiated deviations from the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof. 52 As indicated, a criminal
conviction constitutes a valuable social label because of its high degree of
certitude. Lowering the evidentiary standard may adversely affect the value
of the institution of criminal conviction. Justifying uniform criminal
labeling is problematic, however, since it relies on circular reasoning.
According to this line of justification, given the high cost and extra severity
associated with the criminal label, it should be applied only to those
convicted with especially high certitude. At the same time, the heightened
See Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal, Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty, 49 J.L. & ECON.
353, 353 (2006) (claiming that approximately 95% of all criminal cases in the United States
are secured by guilty pleas, most of them following a bargaining process). Ross, supra note
41, at 717 (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Felony Sentences in
State Courts, 2002, BJS BULL., Dec. 2004, at 1; Admin. Off. of the U.S. Courts, 2004,
Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary, June 30, 2004), makes a similar claim: "In the
criminal justice systems of the 50 states, over 95 percent of all criminal cases are disposed of
without a trial, through the entry of a guilty plea. In the federal system the percentage of
bargained for convictions is even higher." These statistics include all forms of guilty pleas,
not just bargained-for pleas, but nevertheless point to the fact that a great number of criminal
cases are not resolved by means of a full trial in which the issue of culpability is in effect
contested.
149 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1912 ("[Plea bargaining] is not some adjunct to
the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system."); see also John Feinblatt et al.,
The Future of Problem-Solving Courts, 15 CT. MANAGER 28, 31 (2000) (describing criminal
courts as "plea bargain mills").
150 Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. REV.
1, 3 n.6 (1992).
151See Andrew M. Siegel, Moving Down the Wedge of Injustice: A Proposalfor a Third
Generationof Wrongful Convictions Scholarship andAdvocacy, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1219,
1225 (2005) ("It is not simply the fact that we live in a world of plea bargaining that has
systemic consequences for wrongful convictions, but also the mechanisms and rules that we
have adopted for implementing the era of the plea.").
152 See discussion supra Part III.B.2.b.ii.
148
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evidentiary standard for conviction is the basis for the heavier stigma costs
embodied in criminal branding. Because of this circular structure, the
justification for uniformity collapses as soon as one of the basic
assumptions on which it is premised is discarded.
Under the proposed model, the concept of criminal liability may be
fine-tuned. This model will allow for opening the criminal convictions
arena to additional types of convictions with differing values and will
facilitate a hierarchy of social sanctions, suited to the various levels of
certainty on which the criminal conviction is based. Under these
circumstances, the public can regulate social sanctions that are reactive to
the type of criminal conviction-that is, to base mild social sanctions on
those who are branded under a conviction based on the balance of
probabilities and to impose heavier sanctions on those who are labeled
criminal on the basis of certainty "beyond a reasonable doubt." Precisely
because the value of the criminal label depends on the degree of certainty
attributed to it, there is nothing to prevent applying that label along a
spectrum of standards of proof with a hierarchy of social sanctions that
parallels the types of criminal convictions. This would make for a more
exact regulation of social sanctions and thereby improve the expressive
function filled by the criminal conviction label.
The objection relating to the dilution of the criminal conviction label
can be addressed from an additional perspective. There is room to claim
that the devaluation of the "criminal conviction" label has already taken
place with plea bargaining becoming the typical mechanism for disposing
of criminal cases. In a regime where the overwhelming majority of
criminal convictions derive from plea bargains, their stigmatizing effect can
no longer be taken at face value.
iii. Preservation of the Proper Conceptualization of the Judicial Craft
As stated earlier, another possible objection that can be raised against
the proposed model relates to the impairment of the conceptual structuring
of the craft of judging. As previously discussed, under the present system
there is an acoustic separation between the agreements of the parties and the
judicial decision-making process that enables the conceptual structure of
judging to remain intact. The proposed model, on the other hand, turns the
courts into active partners in obtaining results reflecting a preference for
efficiency over precision, and the model thus impairs the proper structuring
of the judicial function. In my opinion, the applicable standard of proof
does not define or conceptualize the essence of judicial decision-making.
The transformation that occurs under the proposed model is limited to the
interface between the parties and to the method by which the risks of error
are assigned between them. From the viewpoint of judicial decision-
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making, there has been no qualitative change. The decision of the court
remains rational, fact-based, and normative in nature. The basis for factfinding continues to be the evidence, and the verdict continues to rest on the
letter of the law. Adjusting the burden of proof downwards to a lower
standard of evidence does not change the nature of judicial decisionmaking, just as it would be inconceivable to claim, that the decision of the
judge in a civil trial is qualitatively different from that of his counterpart in
a criminal trial.
The objection rooted in the proper conceptualization of the function of
judging can also be refuted by attacking its underlying premise that current
plea bargaining is completely exogenous to judicial decision-making. At
the end of the day, plea bargains and agreements of the parties on criminal
liability make their way to court, receive a judicial stamp of approval, and
find shelter under the aegis of a judicial decision. Moreover, the claim of
acoustic separation ignores the interrelation between the trial arena and the
negotiation sphere. The criminal process does not operate in a vacuum.
The outlines of judicial decisions in the criminal process derive from the
size of the court docket and the workload on the system. If not for the
possibility of contractual arrangements in the criminal sphere, the burden on
the court would be sevenfold greater and the character of judicial decisions
would change accordingly. 53 In that sense, it could be claimed that
expanding the scope of agreement in the criminal area would reduce the
load on the system and allow judicial decisions to become even more
meticulous and painstaking.
The final objection outlined in previous parts referred to the possible
damage to public confidence in the judicial system as a result of changing
the standard of proof to a default rule. 154 A number of counterarguments
can be raised against this criticism. First and foremost, one may question
the legitimacy of "public faith" in the system as an intrinsic normative end
in itself and worthy of emulation. Public trust can only be granted when the
system is commendable of it. The question of public confidence in the
system cannot be separated from the question of the judicial system's
objective performance. Second, the argument concerning the public's trust
in the system is relevant only in relation to the transition from the existing
arrangement to the proposed model. Even if one accepts the underlying
assumption of deep public commitment to existing practices and presumes
that lowering the evidentiary standard will harm public confidence in the
system, this does not impede the normative desirability of creating such a
legal system ex nihilo. In this context, a distinction can be drawn between
153 See also Scott & Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1916.
154

See discussion supra Part III.B.2.b.iii.
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the initial desirability of a negotiable standard of proof and the normative
appeal of converting to this model. Finally, there is room to claim that the
intentional dissonance seen in the current regime between how questions of
criminal liability are decided in theory (after the prosecution has proved its
case beyond a reasonable doubt) and how such questions are determined in
practice (through plea bargaining) raises the most powerful public
reservations as to the legitimacy of the judicial system. Many have pointed
to the hypocrisy of using the highly structured criminal procedure as
window dressing while the tasks of the criminal justice system are
accomplished through a market-based negotiation process, hidden from
public scrutiny.' 55 It is precisely the transparency of the proposed bargains
and their effect on the court's decision-making process that may actually
restore public confidence in the process.
So far I have discussed the claim that opening the standard of proof to
negotiation will advance the functional goals of the criminal process as
previously defined. To complete the argument regarding the way in which
the model may be expected to increase social welfare, I shall discuss the
formulation of alternative goals of the criminal process, which deviate from
those outlined thus far. I will attempt to show how the promotion of these
goals through the proposed model can be expected to enhance social utility.
iv. Integrating the Proposed Model into the Definition of the Judicial
Process as a Tool for Resolving Criminal Disputes
When discussing the possible objections to changing the standard of
proof to a default rule, I adopted the public model of criminal process and
assumed a sharp and clear distinction between the "world of agreement"
and the "world of law." The assumption was that, as opposed to the private
sphere of agreement, in the public arena it is incontestable that the judicial
process holds truth as its ultimate goal. In the spirit of this approach, I
defined the quest for truth and accuracy as constituting the solid base of the
criminal trial 156 and as a tool for realizing its expressive goals and its aims
of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Now I would like to
present an alternative, more "private" or "civil" approach, according to
which the search for truth is not the be-all and end-all of the criminal
process. 57 Rather, the primary purpose of the criminal proceeding is the
155 See, e.g., Scott & Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1912.

Farkhanda Zia Mansoor, Reassessing Packer in the Light of International Human
Rights Norms, 4 CONN. PUB. INT'L L.J. 288, 300 (2005) ("One fundamental purpose of the
criminal process is to ensure accuracy of outcomes-or what Bentham termed 'rectitude."').
157 The private paradigm discussed above deals with retraction of the truth in face of the
interests of the parties. This is distinct from retracting the truth in the face of public interests
156
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resolution of criminal disputes-whether defined as disputes between
In
defendant and society or between defense and prosecution.158
only
proceeding,
accordance with such private perception of the criminal
when the parties are not in agreement on the factual happenings must the
truth-seeking alternative be exhausted-the justification being that in such
circumstances truth-seeking is the most effective way to obtain peaceful
resolution of the criminal dispute. In this sense, the goal of the criminal
process is not accomplished when the truth is revealed: truth is only a way
station on the road to the settling of the dispute. The ultimate goal is the
agreement, with truth being a means to achieve it. 159 Since truth-seeking is
not an end in itself, but rather a means for resolving the issues at stake, truth
yields to agreement. Naturally, this "private" or "civil" perception of the
criminal process stands in stark opposition to the public paradigm, which
views the agreement between the parties on questions of fact merely as a
means to discover the truth. Under the public model, where the prosecution
and defense agree on facts, they are presumed to reflect the actual
happenings.
Clearly, the "private" or "civil" approach to criminal trials conflicts
with prevalent criminal theories, according to which the public nature of the
criminal process is incontestable and cannot be infiltrated by private notions
of justice. In the narrow confines of this Article, there is no room to
develop the private paradigm of the criminal process adequately, and this
issue will be postponed for future research. All that I wish to add at this
point is that the recognition of the central role of agreement in criminal
procedures, even overriding truth, is not foreign to the adversarial
paradigm. 60 According to the adversarial model, defense and prosecution
share the prerogative of laying the whole factual basis before the court and
mutually define the limits of the criminal dispute. Their agreement
overrides the factual truth and the court is prevented, in principle, from
examining it independently. That is, the concept of truth in the adversarial
model is relative and plays an instrumental, secondary role. This differs
16
1
from the inquisitorial model, which relies on an absolutist notion of truth.
In light of the instrumental role truth plays in the adversarial model, there is
underlying marital privileges or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, embodied in the
division between "factual truth" and "legal truth."
158

Alternative approaches, which I will not dwell upon here, might define the dispute as

one between victim and offender, at one end of the spectrum, or between the offender and
the law, at the other end of the spectrum.
159See Weigend, supra note 142, at 168.

Scott & Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1909.
Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalizationof
Plea Bargainingand the Americanization Thesis in CriminalProcedure,45 HARV. INT'L L.J.
1, 10 (2004).
160 See

161 Maximo
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no wonder that plea bargaining practices began to flourish in this legal
climate.
Preference for agreement to solve criminal disputes over truth-seeking
is starkly evident in plea bargains of the Alford and nolo contendere types.
In the framework of nolo contendere deals, the defendant refuses to admit
guilt but accepts punishment as if guilty. In Alford pleas, the defendant
agrees to be sentenced in consequence of a plea bargain while continuing to
Recognition of such deals clearly embodies a
protest innocence. 6
approach to the concept of truth, which
and
instrumental
relativistic
withdraws in the face of agreement between prosecution and defense.
At the beginning of the previous section the position was presented
that in the Anglo-American world, where plea bargains are rooted, the
63
public outlines of the criminal process must be rigorously safeguarded.
That is, the very existence of the "negotiation" venue for settling criminal
disputes (in the form of plea bargains) intensifies the need to let criminal
trials, based on the search for truth and the letter of the law, remain the
normative default solution. However, in my opinion, there is room to reject
such an approach. The tremendous scope of plea bargains may signal a
transition from "status" to "contract" in the criminal sphere.1 64 This
transition reflects the preference of private and local justice over a more
inclusive vision of justice based on a search for literal truth. Plea bargains
should not be seen as abnormalities in the criminal sphere. All attempts to
create an artificial formal barrier between the world of agreement and the
world of truth and law, in this context, ignore the common ideological roots
shared by the adversarial paradigm and negotiated resolution of criminal
cases. In other words, the institution of plea bargains strengthens the
private paradigm in the criminal sphere and enhances the recognition of
party control over the criminal case. The very opening of the criminal arena
to negotiation expresses a recognition that criminal justice is not only the
product of the collective search for truth, but may also be the outcome of
private, localized agreements between prosecution and defense., 65 When
the functional aims of the judicial process are examined from the
perspective of such a private paradigm, it appears that the proposed model
162 See Bibas, supra note 18, at 1372-73 (discussing the characteristics of nolo
contendere and Alford pleas).
163 See discussion supra Part lII.B.2.b.iii.
164 See Hughes, supra note 150, at 3 (claiming that the movement from status to contract

has now reached the criminal justice system).
165 Inga Markovits, Playing the Opposites Game: On Mirjan Damaska's The Faces of
Justice and State Authority, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1313, 1321 (1989) (stating that plea bargaining

expresses an agnostic and private view of criminal justice as an outcome of individual
transactions, rather than a collective search for the truth).
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can advance the goals of the judicial process beyond that of the existing
regime. Converting the standard of proof to a default rule will broaden the
negotiation spectrum of the defense and prosecution and is consonant with
the purpose of contractual resolution of the criminal case.
b. Considerations of Autonomy
The preceding discussion was devoted to the argument that changing
the criminal standard of proof to a negotiable variable will not harm the
functional goals of the criminal process, at least in comparison with the
existing situation. Now I will focus on an alternative line of reasoning and
claim that even if the proposed model were to clash with the public goals of
the criminal process, it should be implemented based on considerations
rooted in the defendant's autonomy, which bear greater normative weight.
The following discussion will be dedicated to an analysis of the proposed
model from the perspective of the defendant's autonomy.
As previously explained, it is not possible to resolve a negotiable
standard of proof model with the Kantian approach to the criminal process.
According to Kant, judicial decisions must stem from a process that is
aimed at ascertaining guilt with the maximal certitude rather than at
realizing extrinsic ends. 166 Under the proposed model, attributes of the
criminal process become trading cards in the hands of the defense and
prosecution. They become instruments for realizing external objectives
such as decreasing risk or lowering enforcement costs, and they deviate
from questions of the defendant's guilt or appropriate punishment.
However, the problem with applying the Kantian doctrine to the proposed
model is that it equally applies to current plea bargaining practices.
Accordingly, it is not possible to employ the Kantian criticism to reject the
proposed model without simultaneously rejecting current plea bargains.
Instead, one can justify both the classic plea bargain and the proposed
model using an alternative vision of autonomy, which deviates from the
Kantian paradigm and views the alienability of procedural rights in the
criminal trial as a variable that supports autonomy and reflects the
recognition of the defendant's human dignity.
i. The Criminal Standard of Proof as Part of the Defendant's Autonomy
167
Autonomy literally means "self-rule" or "self-government.'
Although the notion of autonomy takes many forms, it is generally
166 KANT, supra note
167 See CASs

100, at 100.
R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE

SPEECH

138 (1995)

(defining autonomy as an empowerment of individuals to be "authors of the narratives of
their own lives").
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68
understood to include the granting of effective choices to individuals.'
There is room to claim that recognition of the defendant's autonomy
includes allowing him to decide how he wishes to exercise his right to have
the charges against him proven beyond a reasonable doubt. An individual's
1 69
choice in these contexts is vital for the control of his destiny;
acknowledging this choice reflects recognition of his dignity as a human
being. In that sense, implementing the right to a criminal standard of proof
is part of the space of autonomy surrounding the defendant. The defendant
may choose to waive this procedural right in a variety of ways and for many
motives. For example, he may choose to confess to the crime with which
he is charged in order to save the costs of going to trial or in order to avoid
putting witnesses on the stand.1 70 Alternatively, the defendant is entitled to
exercise his rights through the judicial mechanism and to impose upon the
prosecution the requirement to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Just as the right of the defendant to confess or to proclaim his innocence
expresses his autonomy, so does his choice regarding the standard of proof
by which he wishes to be judged. All these options stem from the same
conceptual root. They are all ways by which the defendant can exercise the
right to have the case against him proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

ii. Intervention in the Defendant's Choice to Waive the Right to the
Criminal Standard of Proof
Two counterarguments can be raised against the abovementioned
claim that the alienability of the right to the criminal standard of proof and
the expansion of the spectrum of choice, with regard to the exercise of this
right, will facilitate the defendant's autonomy. Both stem from the notion
that acknowledging waiver of the right to the criminal standard of proof
will, in effect, narrow the array of choices available to the defendant despite
the widening of theoretically viable options. According to the first
objection, the bargained-for waiver of legal rights typically entails both the
expansion of individual autonomy (reflected in the choice to activate the
right by way of waiver) and the narrowing of the defendant's space for
maneuver (as a result of sacrificing the right waived). 7 ' If it should
transpire that the defendant lacks the ability to fully capture the options
from which he must choose or if he fails to understand the implications of
his choice, then the paternalistic setting of limits on the alienability of this
168 See Toone, supra note 62, at 655 (discussing the definition of autonomy).
169 See id.

170 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1913.
171See Jessica Wilen Berg, Understanding Waiver, 40 Hous. L. REv. 281, 293 (2003)
(claiming that waivers often involve both a gain in autonomy and a loss of autonomy, which
must be balanced against each other, in order to maximize the overall autonomy).
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procedural right might be justified.1 72 The second objection is that
converting the standard of proof to a default rule may actually impair the
defendant's ability to exercise his right to have the case against him proven
in court beyond a reasonable doubt, should he choose this option. I will
expand on each of these points.
a. Preservationof the Defendant'sAbility to Exercise Self-Rule
Realization of the ideal of autonomy is conditional upon the
individual's ability to weigh various alternatives, understand their
consequences, rate their costs and benefits, and choose among them. In this
context, one may argue that there is a qualitative difference between the
choices on which plea bargains, as currently constituted, are based and
between the choices that defendants would be required to make under the
proposed model. The choice embodied in agreeing to existing plea bargains
does not require processing of complex data. The alternative offered to
defendants, in exchange for waiving the fact-finding process, is simple and
concrete: near-certain conviction and reduced sentencing. In contrast, the
choice presented by the proposed model is liable to be much more complex
and sophisticated. It requires assessment of the probability of conviction
and calculation of the expected punishment under a lower standard of proof.
Since this alternative is liable to be less concrete from the viewpoint of the
defendant and requires a greater degree of sophistication on his part, and
since the typical defendant may lack the necessary resources to reach an
informed decision in this matter, one may claim that exercising such a
choice is not in line with self-rule-that the possibility of reaching such
agreements for lowering the standard of proof would actually impair the
defendant's autonomy.
However, in my view, such theoretical objections to the proposed
model can be dismissed. Contracting for lowering the standard of proof
does not entail the evaluation of factors that are distinctly different from the
many types of variables that defendants take into consideration on a daily
basis in the course of managing their cases (beginning with waiver of the
right to remain silent, through waiving the right to legal counsel, and ending
with the choice of witnesses for the defense). Moreover, in the current plea
bargain framework, a rational decision as to whether to engage in a plea
bargain requires that defendants evaluate their chances of success at trial

172 Daniel R. Williams, Mitigation and the Capital Defendant Who Wants to Die: A

Study in the Rhetoric ofAutonomy and the Hidden Discourseof Collective Responsibility, 57
HASTINGS L.J. 693, 693 (2006) ("There are instances when the doing of an act in the name of
autonomy represents the very negation of it.").
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and understand the consequences of waiving their trial rights. 173 In other
words, even for existing plea bargain purposes, the defendant must weigh
and assess the expected punishment that the court will mete out as a basis
for comparison. In light of the fact that within the current plea bargain
arena defendants are required to make choices of equal complexity, the
paternalistic argument for placing limits on defendants' ability to waive the
right to the criminal standard of proof must be rejected. Such claims cannot
be argued effectively against the proposed model as a means of protecting
defendant autonomy at a time when they are dismissed with regard to
existing forms of plea bargaining.
b. Preservationof the Ability to Exercise the CriminalStandardof Proof
One can contest the claim that the alienability of the procedural right to
the criminal standard will facilitate defendant autonomy from another
perspective. It may be argued that the mere possibility of engaging in
agreements for lowering the standard of proof will impair the ability of the
potential defendant to exercise his right, that the prosecution prove the case
against him beyond a reasonable doubt. 174 This is due to the negative
signaling effects which may be associated with "insistence" upon the
maximal evidentiary standard, liable to be interpreted as a negative signal
that the defendant was involved in the alleged crime. In other words, in a
legal climate which allows for stipulation of the standard of proof, refusal to
implement a lower standard in a particular trial may be taken as a
presumptive sign of guilt. This negative signaling effect does not exist in
the current practice of plea bargains. On the contrary, refusal to engage in
plea bargaining, within the existing regime, can be interpreted as a positive
signal that the defendant is sincerely convinced of his innocence. Thus, one
might object to the implementation of the proposed model on the grounds
that defendants' rights to a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof
will be compromised-i.e., that opening the standard of proof to negotiation
will impair the ability of the general class of defendants to exercise the right
to the default standard of proof ("beyond reasonable doubt") should they
choose to do so-and, in fact, narrow their maneuvering space.171
173

See Teeter, supra note 96, at 730 (discussing defendant choice within the plea bargain

arena).
174 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413,
1502 (1989) (arguing that plea bargains alter the incentives to invoke the rights to trial and
the privilege against self-incrimination); see also Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers
Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist's Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68
FORDHAM L. REv. 2011, 2078 (2000).
175 This objection is distinct from the more general criticism, which could also be leveled
against the proposed model, that turning the standard of proof to a negotiable default rule
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However, there is room to contest the basic assumption underlying the
above criticism that a defendant's rejection of the proposed model conveys
a negative signal in relation to his innocence. A defendant's rejection of the
prosecution's offer signals, first and foremost, that the offer is not appealing
enough in terms of sentence reduction. It may also express a basic distrust
of the system. This distrust of the prosecution and the court system crosses
all lines and is equally characteristic of completely innocent defendants.
There is no reason to assume that refusing to work out an intermediate deal
is in itself necessarily a signal of guilt.
In conclusion, previous sections of this Article have attempted to
demonstrate that conversion of the criminal standard of proof to a
negotiable variable is not expected to harm the public goals that criminal
procedures are constructed to achieve (and is even expected to advance
them). 176 However, even if the contrary assumption were true, the
conclusion to be drawn is that the defendant's choices should not be
circumscribed for the sake of these public goals. In the choice between
protecting the judicial process and preserving the defendant's dignity, the
latter should prevail. 177 Any other approach would render the defendant an
object in the grip of the system. The public interest in preserving the status
of the judicial system, and in protection of its ethos, must retreat before the
interest of the defendant in the outcome of the criminal trial. Moreover, the
need to focus attention on the autonomy of defendants, as opposed to the
social interests found in the criminal process, is of the essence in light of
plea bargaining practices. As soon as we, as a society, have expressed
willingness to retreat from the collective interest of not convicting the
innocent to acknowledge defendant autonomy (through the adoption of the
will harm defendants, as a general class, by raising their cumulative expected punishment.
Thus, as has been previously demonstrated, adding the ability to enter into deals for lowering
the standard of proof is expected to enable the prosecution to dispose of more criminal cases
and impose on them, collectively, a higher level of sanction. My disregard of this more
general argument is due to the fact that it is not specific to the proposed model. Rather, all
forms of plea bargains, by their very nature, enable the prosecution to handle a larger
inventory of cases, including cases which otherwise would have escaped trial for lack of
resources. See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners' (PleaBargain) Dilemma
(U. MICH. L. & ECON., Olin Working Paper No. 07-0 10, N.Y.U. L. & ECON., Research Paper
No. 07-22, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-1000209 (discussing the prisoners'
dilemma faced by the general class of defendants in the plea bargain context, which places
them collectively in a worse position than the no-plea alternative regime); see also RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 79 (1993) (discussing collective action problems
as a rationale for interference with individual waivers of constitutional rights).
176 See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
177 The most prominent expression of the defendant autonomy ideal can be found in
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In Faretta,the Court claimed that society's
interest in obtaining a just result in the criminal trial did not outweigh the defendant's
autonomy interest. Id. at 834.
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practice of plea bargaining),1 78 it follows that the public interest in guarding
the character of criminal justice and court proceedings must also retreat
before the autonomy of the defendant. 79 The public's interest in the
appearance of justice is secondary to its primary interest in pursuing and
achieving justice. Given society's readiness to sacrifice the search for
justice on the altar of defendant autonomy, it is also possible to rule on the
fate of the appearance of justice in this regard.18 0 The broad social interest
of preserving the autonomy of defendants and their freedom of choice
precedes the narrower public interest in preserving the ethos of criminal
process. This serves as another consideration in favor of removing
obstacles placed upon the alienability of the right to the criminal standard of
proof.
C. THE "QUANTITATIVE" ARGUMENT AGAINST THE PROPOSED
MODEL
Until now the discussion has focused on isolating "qualitative"
differences between the proposed model and the existing plea bargain.
However, as I indicated previously,' 8' normative considerations may also
apply as a matter of degree. It is possible to think of "quantitative"
differences, which give reason to reject the extension of plea bargains and
178 See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 155 (1990) ("Both waiver of rights and

admission of guilt are consistent with the affirmation of individual responsibility that is a
principle of the criminal justice system.").
179

A defendant who pleads guilty effectively waives at once the privilege against selfincrimination, the right to confrontation, and the right to a jury trial. It is, as one
writer put it, "the entire ball game." As plea bargaining emerged as the primary
means of resolving criminal charges, courts began to regard concerns about
inalienable rights and self-destructive waiver as anachronistic, and asked why they
should prevent a defendant from waiving a jury trial if he could relinquish the right to
trial altogether.
Toone, supra note 62, at 646 (citing Ralph S. Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, ProceduralDefault
and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 473, 476 (1978)).
180 Clearly, waiving the criminal standard of proof presents only one possible
manifestation of the inherent tension springing from adversarial criminal procedures between
the autonomy of defendants in their control over their fate and the system's interest in
defending the legitimacy and fairness of the judicial process. It is analogous to other
situations where defendants' choices clash with the public's interest in fair and accurate
procedures. For example, some defendants choose to waive their right to counsel, refrain
from pleading not guilty by reason of insanity, or choose not to call upon certain witnesses in
their defense (possibly to protect family members from the unpleasantness associated with
testifying). See, e.g., Sabelli & Leyton, supra note 129, at 165. My claim that one has to
give preference to the choice of defendants and their control over procedures is equally valid
with regard to these alternate manifestations.
181See supra Part III.B.
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further the contractual ordering in the criminal sphere, by changing the
standard of proof to a negotiable variable. Quantitative discussion requires
greater in-depth treatment than is possible in this framework and will be
surveyed fully in future research. At this time, I will briefly examine the
major quantitative case that can be made against the proposed modelnamely, the fear of increasing the exposure of innocent persons to criminal
convictions beyond what they are currently exposed to under the existing
plea bargain model.
The response to this quantitative criticism becomes apparent in light of
the discussion hereto. Thus, even if the number of false convictions
proliferates under the proposed model, the degree of harm caused by false
convictions does not necessarily increase. Another variable that must be
taken into account is the type of false conviction in terms of both severity
and the cost it entails. Under the proposed model, the specific weight of a
conviction, using a low standard of proof, will not be equivalent to that of a
conviction based on the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. Against the
background of the differential labeling and the variable costs (lower in
certain circumstances) of criminal convictions that the proposed model
would facilitate, one could not invalidate the possibility that the aggregate
costs for wrongful convictions might actually be lower than under the
existing model, despite the increased number of convictions. That is to say,
the issue of degree of exposure to wrongful convictions becomes more
refined under the proposed model. It is no longer solely a function of the
number of convictions, but it is also a function of the costs of those
convictions.
Moreover, there is room to contest the a priori assumption that the per
se number of false convictions will necessarily rise under the proposed
model. As I have already indicated, the interim bargain is likely to increase
both parties' utilities even in situations where, under the current set of
available options, both parties would opt for a full plea bargain. 82 That is,
the proposed model might be an attractive alternative not only to the pool of
cases currently making their way into the court system, but also to the cases
in which the question of criminal liability is presently settled outside the
courtroom. In this latter class of cases, the negotiation process between the
parties and the circumstances surrounding the guilty plea currently remain a
black box from the standpoint of the courts. Under the proposed model, on
the other hand, if interim deals are struck, the courts will enter into the heart
of the case and the evidence in order to decide the issue of criminal liability.
The quantitative attack can take on a different character-advantages
associated with the practice of plea bargains may diminish under the
182 See supra Part II.D.1.
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proposed model. A central argument, which may be raised in this respect,
is that the practice of plea bargaining was adopted because of its utility in
reducing court overload. 183 If turning the standard of proof to a default rule
should prove to decrease this benefit significantly, it would be a reason to
reject the proposed model, despite the corresponding adoption of full plea
bargains. However, trial risks and costs are not inherently binary in the
sense of all (trial) or nothing (plea bargain). In accordance with the
proposed legal regime, certain judicial procedures will become less costly
and less time-consuming, as a result of reallocating the evidentiary burdens
between the prosecution and the defense and the lower standard of proof
demanded of the prosecution. In that sense, the fact that the proposed
model would reduce the number of cases that are today settled by plea
bargaining is not the end of the story. It should be remembered that,
parallel to this, the proposed deals may be expected to include cases which
today are settled by full trial, according to the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard of proof. In these cases, the alternative of conducting judicial
proceedings according to a lower standard of proof may lower the costs of
trial to the taxpayer. The issue of how this will affect case load is basically
empirical and cannot be predicted. Nevertheless, there is no reason to
assume, a priori, that the benefits embedded in contractual arrangements in
the area of criminal justice will turn out to be lower under the proposed
model than under current practices.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article examined the possibility of converting the standard of
proof in criminal proceedings to a default rule, open to stipulation by the
prosecution and defense. According to the proposed model, the defendant
could grant the prosecution an across-the-board waiver of the burden of
proof by trading the applicable evidentiary standard for a lighter sentence.
This possibility comes in addition to the existing vertical waiver system of
plea bargaining based on self-incrimination. When viewing all the factors
that have been surveyed above, it becomes clear that extending the
boundaries of negotiation in criminal cases in the manner described would
be both practically viable and normatively desirable.

183 Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REv. 695, 704
(2001)

(stating that "some of plea bargaining's most resolute defenders believe that the court system
needs plea bargaining in order to avoid a disastrous failure of the system as a result of the
overwhelming number of cases that courts otherwise would have to try. However, it is more
likely that plea bargaining endures because courts and prosecutors routinely rely on the
process to dispose of their caseloads in an efficient and timely fashion."); see also Fisher,
supra note 92, at 893 (explaining plea bargaining as an adjustment to caseload pressures).
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This Article defined the range of situations in which the parties would
find it beneficial to engage in such deals for reducing the standard of proof
in return for sentence mitigation. The relevant situations are those in which
the parties' MRS between units of punishment and units of evidentiary
waiver equalize at an intermediate point between a full trial and a full plea
bargain. In those circumstances, deals for partial conversion of some units
of reduction in the evidentiary demands in exchange for some units of
punishment are likely to improve the situation of both parties as compared
to full conversion (plea bargains) or non-conversion (a full trial according
to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard).
As has been demonstrated, three possible factors may influence the
parties' MRS: the marginal costs to the prosecution of gathering evidence
and managing the trial at various levels of proof, the defendant's attitude
toward risk, and the subjective assessment of the parties regarding their
chances for success according to different standards of proof. In addition,
there are signaling advantages latent in the interim deals, from the point of
view of both defendant and prosecution, as a result of which both might
prefer this bargain over a full plea bargain.
After characterizing the range of situations in which the prosecution
and defense are likely to work out a deal for reducing the standard of proof
in criminal proceedings, the normative desirability of this type of agreement
was examined. In order to consider the expansion of the negotiation
boundaries between prosecution and defense, the Article set out by
exploring the rationales for and against opening the criminal arena to plea
bargaining. It was argued that the thriving institution of plea bargains
embodies a normative judgment that recognizes its legitimacy in principle.
This normative judgment served as a general reference point: In its light,
the Article examined whether the proposed model has any unique
disadvantages which do not exist in the current practice of plea bargaining
and on whose basis it is possible to reject intermediate arrangements, even
if full plea bargaining is considered legitimate.
The underlying distinction between the proposed intermediate
arrangement and the full plea bargain was exposed. The Article argued that
the difference between existing plea bargains and the proposed model lies
not in the waiver of the procedural right that the charge against a defendant
be proven by the criminal standard of proof, but in the manner by which
this right is waived. Under the existing regime of plea bargains, waivers are
exogenous to the judicial process, while the proposed model incorporates
the waiver into the system.
From this analysis, conclusions were drawn as to the type of normative
arguments that can be leveled against the proposed model. It was claimed
that objections should focus on the ramifications of the fact that the waiver
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is implemented through the judicial mechanism. Discussion of this
criticism of the criminal process revolved around two central theoretical
paradigms: the deontological paradigm (the Kantian doctrine) and the
utilitarian paradigm.
A possible objection against the proposed model from the Kantian
perspective is that the purpose of the criminal process is not the efficient
resolution of the criminal dispute-that is, the promotion of external social
ends, such as deterrence, or the utility of the defendant-but rather
safeguarding the legitimacy of the act of punishment. In accordance with
this view, changing the exposure of the defendant to the risk of either
wrongful conviction or too light a punishment, as a way of benefiting the
defense and the prosecution, negates the moral legitimacy of the criminal
trial and impairs the defendant's human dignity.
The Article then evaluated the desirability of the proposed model in
light of this theoretical objection. The argument was made that the Kantian
criticism "overshoots" since even existing practices of plea bargaining will
not pass through its sieve. Against that background, an alternative notion of
autonomy was suggested to justify both plea bargaining and the
intermediate deal, according to which the defendant waives his procedural
right to the criminal standard of proof.
The Article then examined the hypothetical attack on the proposed
model from the utilitarian perspective. It showed how the application of a
default regime with regard to the standard of proof may harm the functional
aims of the criminal trial, including the determination of criminal liability,
the expressive functions of the criminal process, and the proper
conceptualization of the judicial craft.
However, a careful look at these aims revealed not only that changing
the standard of proof into a default variable would not harm them, but that it
would actually promote and improve the chances of their realization. The
application of the proposed model is likely to enhance the decision on the
issue of criminal liability, allowing for the transformation of the question of
criminal liability from a qualitative question of "yes or no" to a quantitative
question of "how much." In that way, it will properly reflect all the gray
areas that characterize the nature of this decision, at least from the
evidentiary aspect. The proposed model is also expected to refine the
expressive functions of the criminal process and the criminal verdict.
Opening the "sentencing market" to additional types of convictions, with
varying values to suit the levels of certitude on which the conviction is
based, will supply richer and more precise data in regard to criminal
labeling. In addition, the proposed model will not materially harm the
proper conceptualization of the task of judging.
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The next stage of the discussion was devoted to an alternative, more
"civil law" approach to the functional goals of the criminal trial, which a
default standard of proof can be expected to promote. The conclusion
reached in light of the above is that the proposed model is neither more
faulty nor costlier than the present system of plea bargaining.
At the margins of the qualitative discussion, the Article dealt with
some quantitative objections. It examined whether the proposed model has
defects that may not be unique to it but which may be more pronounced
than under the existing system of plea bargains, and whether for that reason
the proposed model should be rejected, despite the adoption of plea
bargaining. In this context, the question of added exposure to wrongful
conviction was considered. The Article claimed that exposure to wrongful
conviction should be examined, not by quantity, but by level and severity.
Given the disparate costs of criminal convictions that the proposed model
would facilitate, the aggregate costs of wrongful convictions would not
necessarily be higher than under current plea bargain practices, despite the
increased number of false convictions.
Finally, the Article contended with the alternative quantitative
argument, according to which the reason for rejecting the proposed model is
that the advantages supporting the current full plea bargaining system
would diminish. The central argument, in this context, touched upon the
savings in judicial resources and court administration costs under the
existing plea bargaining system, which may be reduced under the proposed
model, based on a fact-finding process. As this Article attempted to show,
under the proposed legal regime of a negotiable standard of proof, certain
judicial trials are expected to consume less court time than parallel trials
according to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof, as a result
of the negotiated re-allocation of evidentiary requirements between the
parties. Since the proposed deals may be expected to erode, not only into
the pool of cases currently resolved under full plea bargains, but also into
the inventory of cases which currently make their way into the court, the
issue of how the proposed model will affect case loads is basically
empirical and cannot be predicted. However, it was claimed that there is no
reason for the a priori assumption that the benefits embedded in existing
plea bargaining practices will prove to be lower under the proposed regime.
When all these considerations are combined, the conclusion to be
drawn is that objection to deals hinging on the standard of proof can only
come from those who challenge the very notion of opening the criminal
arena to negotiation. Considering that plea bargaining is recognized and
regarded as a legitimate practice, clearly one must accept the proposed
model. In this sense, this Article can be read in one of two ways. The first
way, advocated throughout this Article, is to view the proposition to change
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the standard of proof to a default rule as a practical model, aimed at
promoting efficiency in conducting criminal procedures and giving
expression to individual autonomy. This would be accomplished by
increasing the defendant and prosecution's potential control of criminal
procedures and by removing obstacles that limit their maneuverability in
their attempts to work out arrangements. The second way to read this
Article is as a litmus test for the widespread practice of plea bargaining, a
practice by which most criminal cases are currently resolved. In that
context, the proposed model sheds light on contractual ordering in the
criminal sphere and even, in a broader sense, on the whole adversarial
method. Either way, the conclusion is one and the same: It is not possible
to justify the existing borderline between alienable procedural rights under
the current practice of plea bargains and between the right to the criminal
standard of proof, which is considered a nonnegotiable variable of the
criminal trial. Wherever plea bargains are accepted, the standard of proof
used in criminal procedures should be negotiable and vice versa: rejection
of the proposition to convert the standard of proof to a default rule is
possible only on the basis of an outright rejection of contractual
arrangements in the criminal sphere.
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